Journal ArticleDOI
The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations
TLDR
The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.About:
This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 4195 citations till now.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Keeping it all in the Family: The Role of Particularistic Relationships in Business Group Performance during Institutional Transition
Xiaowei Luo,Chi-Nien Chung +1 more
TL;DR: The authors examined the role of particularistic relationships (such as family and prior social ties) in business groups during institutional transition and test how particularistic ties between top leaders affect business group performance in Taiwan, where such ties have been central to the functioning of business groups.
Journal ArticleDOI
Is Corporate Diversification Beneficial in Emerging Markets
Karl V. Lins,Henri Servaes +1 more
TL;DR: This article found that diversified firms trade at a discount of approximately 7% compared to single-segment firms, and that the discount is most severe when management control rights substantially exceed their cash flow rights.
Journal ArticleDOI
Private Benefits of Control, Ownership, and the Cross-listing Decision
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate how a foreign firm's decision to cross-list on a U.S. stock exchange is related to the consumption of private benefits of control by its controlling shareholders.
Journal ArticleDOI
How Are U.S. Family Firms Controlled
Belen Villalonga,Raphael Amit +1 more
TL;DR: The authors of as mentioned in this paper suggest that the potential agency conflict between large shareholders and public shareholders in the United States is as relevant as elsewhere in the world, and suggest that this second type of agency problem is also significant in United States.
BookDOI
Investor protection, ownership, and the cost of capital
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors combine the agency theory of the firm with risk diversification incentives for insiders, showing that the premium for bearing idiosyncratic risk varies between zero and six percent and decreases the level of outside investor protection.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Posted Content
Law and Finance
Rafael La Porta,Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Andrei Shleifer,Robert W. Vishny,Robert W. Vishny +7 more
TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Sanford J. Grossman,Oliver Hart +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.
Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate Ownership Around the World
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.