Journal ArticleDOI
The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations
TLDR
The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.About:
This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 4195 citations till now.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate boards and the performance of Asian firms: A meta-analysis
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a meta-analysis of the relationship between board attributes and performance of Asian firms using a varied set of meta-analytical techniques on a database of 86 studies covering nine Asian countries.
Journal ArticleDOI
Earnings management of distressed firms during debt renegotiation
Norman Mohd Saleh,Kamran Ahmed +1 more
TL;DR: The authors examined discretionary accruals in distressed firms that have undertaken debt contract renegotiation subsequent to debt covenant violation with a view to determining whether managers adopt income-decreasing accrual during debt renegotiation.
Posted Content
The Costs of Group Affiliation: Evidence from East Asia
TL;DR: This paper examined the costs of business group affiliation using data for 2,600 firms in nine East Asian economies for the 1994-1996 period and found that group-affiliated firms are on average valued below independent firms, with the discount attributable to firms whose ultimate owners have voting rights exceeding cash flow rights.
Journal ArticleDOI
Family-firm risk-taking: Does religion matter?
TL;DR: Li et al. as mentioned in this paper found that firms founded by religious entrepreneurs have lower leverage and less investment in fixed and intangible assets compared to non-religious entrepreneurs, but these findings primarily hold for entrepreneurs who adhere to Western religions but not to Eastern religions.
Journal ArticleDOI
Should business groups be dismantled? The equilibrium costs of efficient internal capital markets
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the relationship between conglomerates' internal capital markets and the efficiency of economy-wide capital allocation, and identify a novel cost of conglomeration that arises from an equilibrium framework.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Posted Content
Law and Finance
Rafael La Porta,Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Andrei Shleifer,Robert W. Vishny,Robert W. Vishny +7 more
TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Sanford J. Grossman,Oliver Hart +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.
Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate Ownership Around the World
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.