Journal ArticleDOI
The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations
TLDR
The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.About:
This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 4195 citations till now.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Accounting Earnings in East Asia
Joseph P. H. Fan,T.J. Wong +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors hypothesize that the threat of expropriation by controlling owners in East Asian corporations lowers the credibility of accounting earnings and hence the stock price informativeness of those earnings.
ReportDOI
Inside the Family Firm: The Role of Families in Succession Decisions and Performance
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the impact of family characteristics in corporate decision making, and the consequences of these decisions on firm performance, and find that family successions have a large negative causal impact on firms' performance.
Journal ArticleDOI
Board, audit committee, culture and earnings management: Malaysian evidence
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the extent of the effectiveness of monitoring functions of board of directors, audit committee and concentrated ownership in reducing earnings management among 97 firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia over the period 2002•2003.
Book ChapterDOI
Corporate Governance and Control
TL;DR: Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders as mentioned in this paper, which is a fundamental dilemma of corporate governance: regulation of large shareholder intervention may provide better protection to small shareholders; but such regulations may increase managerial discretion and scope for abuse.
Journal ArticleDOI
Socially responsible firms
TL;DR: The authors found that well-governed firms that suffer less from agency concerns (less cash abundance, positive pay-for-performance, small control wedge, strong minority protection) engage more in CSR.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Posted Content
Law and Finance
Rafael La Porta,Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Andrei Shleifer,Robert W. Vishny,Robert W. Vishny +7 more
TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Sanford J. Grossman,Oliver Hart +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.
Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate Ownership Around the World
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.