Journal ArticleDOI
The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations
TLDR
The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.About:
This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 4195 citations till now.read more
Citations
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Financial crisis and the dynamics of corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan's listed firms
TL;DR: In this paper, a study complements the governance literature by investigating how Taiwan listed firms adjusted their governance structure to cope with the 2008 financial crisis and found that there are significant differences in the factor scores, such as Board Power (of the largest shareholders), Information Transparency and Related Party Transactions.
Posted Content
Which Investors Fear Expropriation? Evidence from Investors' Stock Picking
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyse whether investors take into account corporate governance when they select stocks and find that all categories of investors who generally enjoy only security benefits (domestic and foreign; institutional and small individual investors) are reluctant to invest in companies with bag corporate governance.
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Does Corporate Governance Matter? Evidence from Related Party Transactions in Malaysia
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the moderating effect of corporate governance on the related party transactions-performance relationship and found evidence that related transactions are detrimental to shareholders and thus reducing firm performance, but the negative effect is mitigated with the presence of good governance namely level of board independence and executive remuneration.
Journal ArticleDOI
Financial Globalization, Governance, and the Evolution of the Home Bias
TL;DR: This paper found that the average home bias of US investors towards the 46 countries with the largest equity markets did not fall from 1994 to 2004 when countries were equally weighted but fell when countries are weighted by market capitalisation.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
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Law and Finance
Rafael La Porta,Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Andrei Shleifer,Robert W. Vishny,Robert W. Vishny +7 more
TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Sanford J. Grossman,Oliver Hart +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.
Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate Ownership Around the World
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.