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Journal ArticleDOI

The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations

TLDR
The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.
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This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 4195 citations till now.

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Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives

TL;DR: In this paper, a parsimonious model of matching and incentives generates implications that are test with data from administrative and survey data to study the match between firms and managers, including manager characteristics, firm characteristics, detailed measures of managerial practices and outcomes for the firm and the manager.
Journal ArticleDOI

Ownership structure and open market stock repurchases in France

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine open market stock repurchases in France and find a positive average market reaction to the repurchase announcement, however, the magnitude of the price reaction is found to depend on a number of corporate governance structure measures.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Role of Investment, Financing and Dividend Decisions in Explaining Corporate Ownership Structure: Empirical Evidence from Spain

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed the determinants of ownership structure by focusing on the role played by investment, financing and dividend decisions, and found that increases in debt lead insiders to limit the risk they bear by reducing their holdings, monitoring by large outside owners substitutes for the disciplinary role of debt.
Journal ArticleDOI

Do Country-level Investor Protections Affect Security-level Contract Design? Evidence from Foreign Bond Covenants

TL;DR: In this article, the ability of security-level contracts to substitute for poor country-level investor protections was studied using a cross-country sample of restrictive covenants, and they found that bond contacts are more likely to include covenants when creditor protection laws are weak.
ReportDOI

Business Groups and the Big Push: Meiji Japan's Mass Privatization and Subsequent Growth

TL;DR: Rodan as mentioned in this paper argues that economic development requires coordinated investment in many interdependent industries, and prescribes a flood of state-controlled investment across all sectors, a so-called big push.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Posted Content

Law and Finance

TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Book

The Modern Corporation and Private Property

TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration

TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.
Journal ArticleDOI

Corporate Ownership Around the World

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.
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