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Journal ArticleDOI

The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations

TLDR
The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.
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This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 4195 citations till now.

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Ownership structure, corporate governance and productive efficiency in China

TL;DR: Wang et al. as mentioned in this paper investigated whether and to what extent ownership structure and corporate governance affect productive efficiency in a sample of 744 publicly listed manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2006.
Journal ArticleDOI

Ownership concentration, earnings management and stock market liquidity: evidence from Malaysia

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined whether ownership concentration and earnings management affect the stock market liquidity of Malaysian firms using a sample of 2,020 yearly firm observations in Bursa Malaysia over the period 2009-2012.
Journal ArticleDOI

Effect of Governance Reforms on Corporate Ownership in Italy: Is It Still Pizza, Spaghetti, and Mandolino?

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors describe the logic that guides the implementation of corporate governance reforms and investigate the extent to which the logic leads to an increase in investor protection, using the example of Italy, where major governance reforms were passed in 1998 to protect minority shareholders from the risk of expropriation.
Journal ArticleDOI

Political connections and voluntary disclosure: Evidence from around the world

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate whether and how political connections affect managers' voluntary disclosure choices and find that, relative to non-connected firms, connected firms have a greater increase in the frequency of management forecasts subsequent to elections that damage their political ties.
Journal ArticleDOI

Debt and Entrenchment: Evidence from Thailand and Indonesia

TL;DR: The results show that the debt structure is linked to the corporate governance, and weaker corporate governance firms, in particular measured by the entrenchment effects, tend to have a higher debt level.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Posted Content

Law and Finance

TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Book

The Modern Corporation and Private Property

TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration

TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.
Journal ArticleDOI

Corporate Ownership Around the World

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.
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