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Journal ArticleDOI

The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations

TLDR
The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.
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This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 4195 citations till now.

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The effects of ownership concentration and corporate debt on corporate divestitures in Chinese listed firms

TL;DR: Li et al. as discussed by the authors examined how ownership concentration and corporate debt impact corporate divestitures in China and found that ownership concentration by the largest shareholder depressed corporate divitures both in state-controlled and in non-state-controlled firms.
Journal ArticleDOI

An examination of the impact of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act on the attractiveness of U.S. capital markets for foreign firms

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine whether voluntary deregistrations after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) were intended to benefit common shareholders by avoiding firms' costs of complying with SOX or to protect the control rents of managers or controlling shareholders (MCOs).
Journal ArticleDOI

Related Party Transactions and Firm Value: Evidence from Property Markets in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore

TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify three main channels for REIT RPTs: real estate asset acquisitions from related parties (57.4%), income earned from related party (22.2%), and management fees paid to related parties.
Journal ArticleDOI

Changing Performance of Business Groups over Two Decades: Technological Capabilities and Investment Inefficiency in Korean Chaebols

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used productive efficiency rather than financial efficiency as a performance measure to compare the performance of Korean chaebols and non-chaebols in terms of technological capabilities and investment inefficiency.
Journal ArticleDOI

Ownership, control, valuation and performance of Brazilian corporations

TL;DR: The authors analyzes the ownership and control structure of Brazilian companies and the effect of cash flow and voting rights on firm valuation and performance, finding evidence that non-voting shares and indirect control structures are largely used to concentrate control with reduced overall investment in the company.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Posted Content

Law and Finance

TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Book

The Modern Corporation and Private Property

TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration

TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.
Journal ArticleDOI

Corporate Ownership Around the World

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.
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