Journal ArticleDOI
The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations
TLDR
The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.About:
This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 4195 citations till now.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Institutions and Organizational Structure: The Case of State-Owned Corporate Pyramids
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider an explanation for pyramids built by the state: separating firms from political interference and find that intermediate pyramidal layers insulate managers from a pyramid's top owners and hence induce agency costs, they also minimize political costs of state intervention.
Journal ArticleDOI
What drives firms' intent to seek strategic assets by foreign direct investment? A study of emerging economy firms
TL;DR: The authors studied the first step leading to catch-up, namely the managerial intent to acquire strategic assets that help closing the gap, and identified key factors contributing to firms' strategic intent to catch up by acquiring strategic assets abroad.
Journal ArticleDOI
Separation of Ownership from Control and Acquiring Firm Performance: The Case of Family Ownership in Canada
Walid Ben-Amar,Paul André +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the relationship between ownership structure and acquiring firm performance and found that a large proportion of Canadian public companies have controlling shareholders (families) that often exercise control over voting rights while holding a small fraction of the cash flow rights.
Journal ArticleDOI
Business Groups: An Integrated Model to Focus Future Research
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a systematic and integrative framework for understanding business groups, focusing on the distinctive roles of the group affiliates and the coupling and order between the parent firm and its affiliates.
Journal ArticleDOI
Multiple Large Shareholders, Control Contests, and Implied Cost of Equity
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine whether the presence of multiple large shareholders alleviates firm's agency costs and information asymmetry embedded in ultimate ownership structures and find evidence that the implied implied cost of equity decreases in presence of large shareholders beyond the controlling owner.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Posted Content
Law and Finance
Rafael La Porta,Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Andrei Shleifer,Robert W. Vishny,Robert W. Vishny +7 more
TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Book
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Sanford J. Grossman,Oliver Hart +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.
Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate Ownership Around the World
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.