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Journal ArticleDOI

The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations

TLDR
The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.
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This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 4195 citations till now.

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Governance and Bank Valuation

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors construct a new database on the ownership of banks internationally and then assess the ramifications of ownership, shareholder protection laws, and supervisory and regulatory policies on bank valuations.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Importance of Social Capital to the Management of Multinational Enterprises: Relational Networks Among Asian and Western Firms

TL;DR: In this article, the development and management of social capital has become of critical importance for competitive advantage in global markets, and the authors propose a framework for developing and managing social capital from Asian firms.
Journal ArticleDOI

Perpetuating traditional influences: voluntary disclosure in malaysia following the economic crisis

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compared the influence of insider domination and government ownership on the extent of voluntary disclosure in Malaysian company annual reports and found that despite the upheaval of the economic crisis, traditional influences of director ownership and family domination of the board outweigh the effect of government-backed accountability initiatives.
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Institutions Behind Family Ownership and Control in Large Firms

TL;DR: In this article, the impact of family ownership and control on firm value is associated with the level of shareholder protection embodied in legal and regulatory institutions of a country, and the contours of a cross-country, institution-based view of corporate governance are sketched.
Journal ArticleDOI

How national systems differ in their constraints on corporate executives: a study of CEO effects in three countries

TL;DR: Results provide strong, robust evidence that the effect of CEOs on firm performance—for good and for ill—is substantially greater in U.S. firms than in German and Japanese firms.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Posted Content

Law and Finance

TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Book

The Modern Corporation and Private Property

TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration

TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.
Journal ArticleDOI

Corporate Ownership Around the World

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.
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