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Journal ArticleDOI

The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations

TLDR
The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.
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This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 4195 citations till now.

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Citations
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Corporate governance and investment-cash flow sensitivity: Evidence from emerging markets

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate how firms' corporate governance influences financing constraints and find that better corporate governance lowers the dependence of emerging market firms on internally generated cash flows, and reduces financing constraints that would otherwise distort efficient allocation of investment and destroy firm value.
Journal ArticleDOI

Political connections, corporate governance and preferential bank loans

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated how political connections are related to preferential bank loans, how the entrenched position of the ruling party affects the types of preferential bank loan, and how corporate governance is related to preference bank loans.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Political Economy of Residual State Ownership in Privatized Firms: Evidence from Emerging Markets

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the determinants of residual state ownership after privatization over a window of up to six years after divestiture, and found that the state ownership is largely influenced by the size of the firm, the level of investor protection and the extent of corruption in the country.
Journal ArticleDOI

Propping and tunneling: Empirical evidence from Japanese keiretsu.

TL;DR: This paper examined the response of horizontal and vertical keiretsu to the changing economic and regulatory climate in Japan from 1987 to 2001, and found evidence of profit tunneling of more weakly affiliated firms during strong economic times.
Journal ArticleDOI

Family CEOs: Do they benefit firm performance in China?

TL;DR: Li et al. as discussed by the authors found that family CEOs, as a whole, are positively related to firm performance, as measured by both market-based and accounting-based performance, reflecting Tobin's Q and ROA.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Posted Content

Law and Finance

TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Book

The Modern Corporation and Private Property

TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
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The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration

TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.
Journal ArticleDOI

Corporate Ownership Around the World

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.
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