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Journal ArticleDOI

The separation of ownership and control in east asian corporations

TLDR
The authors examined the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries and found that voting rights frequently exceed cash-ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings.
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This article is published in Journal of Financial Economics.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 4195 citations till now.

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Innovation and Family Ownership: Empirical Evidence from India

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the direct effect of family ownership on innovation in emerging markets by using data from Indian family-controlled publicly listed firms as its sample, and found that affiliating with top 50 business groups increased the innovation activities of these family firms.
Journal ArticleDOI

Ownership Concentration and Executive Compensation in Closely Held Firms: Evidence from Hong Kong

TL;DR: The relationship between ownership concentration and executive compensation in Hong Kong has been investigated in this article, showing a positive relationship between managerial ownership and cash emoluments for levels of ownership of up to 35% in small and in family controlled firms, and for up to 10% in large firms.
Journal ArticleDOI

The international evidence on performance and equity ownership by insiders, blockholders, and institutions

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the effects of insider ownership by insiders and institutional ownership by blockholders and institutions on performance using samples of firms from four countries ( United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan).
Journal ArticleDOI

Agency problems and performance of Korean companies during the Asian financial crisis: Chaebol vs. non-chaebol firms

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined whether agency problems explain the performance of Korean companies during the Asian financial crisis and whether the agency problems explained the performance differently for chaebol vs. non-chaebol firms.
Journal ArticleDOI

Do women in top management affect firm performance? Evidence from Indonesia

Salim Darmadi
- 10 Nov 2013 - 
TL;DR: In this article, a cross-sectional regression analysis was conducted based on a sample comprising 92.4 percent of public firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), and the dependent variable was firm performance, measured by return on assets (ROA) and Tobin's q.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on recent progress in the theory of property rights, agency, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm, which casts new light on and has implications for a variety of issues in the professional and popular literature.
Posted Content

Law and Finance

TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Book

The Modern Corporation and Private Property

TL;DR: Weidenbaum and Jensen as mentioned in this paper reviewed the impact of developments not fully anticipated by Berle and Means, such as the rise of the service sector, and the significant role played by institutional investors in the owner/manager equation.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration

TL;DR: In this paper, a theory of costly contracts is presented, which emphasizes the contractual rights can by of two types: specific rights and residual rights, and when it is costly to list all specific rights over assets, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights.
Journal ArticleDOI

Corporate Ownership Around the World

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms, and they find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation.
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