Showing papers on "Delegation published in 2015"

Delegation and pooling in international organizations

Abstract: We conceive authority of an international organization as latent in two independent dimensions: delegation by states to international agents and pooling in collective decision making bodies. We theorize that delegation and pooling are empirically as well as conceptually different. Delegation is an effort to deal with the transaction costs of cooperation which are greater in larger, broader, and correspondingly more complex organizations. Pooling reflects the tension between protecting or surrendering the national veto. This paper theorizes that delegation and pooling are constrained by two basic design features: a) the scope of an IO’s policy portfolio and b) the scale of its membership. We test these hypotheses with a new cross-sectional dataset that provides detailed and reliable information on IO decision making. Our major finding is that the design of international organizations is framed by stark and intelligible choices, but in surprising ways. Large membership organizations tend to have both more delegation and more pooling. The broader the policy scope of an IO, the more willing are its members to delegate, but the less willing they are to pool authority.

A dynamical consensus method based on exit-delegation mechanism for large group emergency decision making

Abstract: Aiming at the lower consensus and the urgency of large group emergency decision making, a dynamical consensus method based on an exit-delegation mechanism is proposed and investigated. Firstly, the method is initiated by transferring a large group into small groups via the preference clustering method. Then, the consistency and consensus measures are calculated and two different criteria are used to guide the consensus reaching process. In addition, considering the urgency of emergency decision making, an exit-delegation mechanism is introduced to deal with clusters. When the consistency/consensus level is low, the proximity index of each cluster is computed. For the cluster whose proximity degree is lower than the threshold, it is advised to exit the decision-making process and a delegation mechanism is employed to reserve his influence by giving trust weights to other clusters. Meantime, a feedback mechanism is developed to give advice to clusters whose preferences should be subject to change, and to obtain a solution which satisfies the consistency and consensus criteria simultaneously. Finally, a case is taken to verify the rationality and feasibility of the method.

Public Key Encryption with Delegated Equality Test in a Multi-User Setting

Abstract: Probabilistic public key encryption with equality test (PKEET), introduced by Yang et al. in CT-RSA 2010, is able to check whether two ciphertexts are encryptions of the same message under different public keys without leaking anything else about the message encrypted under either public key. PKEET schemes have many applications, for example, in constructing searchable encryption and partitioning encrypted data. Previous PKEET schemes lack a delegation mechanism for users to specify who can perform the equality test between their ciphertexts. In this paper, we propose the notion of public key encryption with delegated equality test (PKE-DET), which requires only the delegated party to deal with the work in a practical multi-user setting, and present a concrete construction in Type 2 pairing, which is provably secure under the newly introduced security notions.

Peers or parents? On non-monetary incentives in schools

Abstract: This paper presents the result of a field experiment on the effectiveness of non-monetary incentives on pupils' achievement on a mathematical multiple choice test. Our sample consists of 2113 pupils of deprived and high-achieving secondary schools in Germany. Based on a pre-study, we compare the effectiveness of (i) a medal (ii) a letter of praise to the parents and (iii) a delegation of choice over incentives. The effect of non-monetary incentives depends on pupils' socio-economic background. While they constitute a potentially cost-effective and easily implementable method of motivation in Non-High Schools, predetermined non-monetary incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation for pupils in High Schools. In contrast, the endogenous choice of the reward increases pupils' willingness to prepare for the test and mitigates the negative effect of predetermined external rewards in High Schools. Additionally, in the delegation treatment, we find that low-achieving pupils typically choose a reward with a higher signaling value to their parents, independent of the school type.

Citizens' Blame of Politicians for Public Service Failure: Experimental Evidence about Blame Reduction through Delegation and Contracting

Abstract: Theories of blame suggest that contracting out public service delivery reduces citizens’ blame of politicians for service failure. The authors use an online experiment with 1,000 citizen participants to estimate the effects of information cues summarizing service delivery arrangements on citizens’ blame of English local government politicians for poor street maintenance. Participants were randomized to one of four cues: no information about service delivery arrangements, politicians’ involvement in managing delivery, delegation to a unit inside government managing delivery, and delegation through a contract with a private firm managing delivery. The politicians managing delivery cue raises blame compared to citizens having no information. However, the contract with a private firm cue does not reduce blame compared to either no information or the politicians managing delivery cue. Instead, the delegation to a unit inside government cue reduces blame compared to politicians managing delivery, suggesting that delegation to public managers, not contracting, reduces blame in this context.

Money and multilateralism: how funding rules constitute IO governance

Abstract: International relations scholarship largely accepts that multilateralism lies at the heart of the liberal international order and is instantiated in formal, intergovernmental organizations. This paper revisits the conventional wisdom regarding the multilateral character of international organization (IO) governance by drawing attention to the funding methods used to finance contemporary IOs. I argue that different funding rules constitute different modes of governance. While mandatory funding rules are easily reconciled with traditional conceptions of multilateralism, voluntary rules are not. In particular, restricted voluntary funding rules devolve authority over funding decisions to individual actors, undercutting the collective decision making that is central to multilateral governance. I demonstrate the relevance of the argument in the case of the United Nations, which has transformed from an institution reliant primarily on mandatory contributions, to one disproportionately reliant on restricted, voluntary funds. The counterintuitive result is an increasingly bilateral United Nations. The paper contributes to our understanding of the relationship between multilateralism and IO governance, and has implications for literature related to institutional design, delegation, and development aid. In addition, it raises empirical and normative questions regarding reliance on voluntary funding.

How do informal agreements and renegotiation shape contractual reference points

Abstract: The notion of contracts as reference points provides the basis for a deeper understanding of important phenomena such as the employment contract, vertical integration, firm scope, authority, and delegation. Previous experiments lend support to this notion but they ignore realistic aspects of trading relationships such as informal agreements and ex-post renegotiation or revision. Here we show that the central behavioral mechanism underlying contractual reference points is robust to such considerations. Our data reveal that informal agreements can mitigate the trade-off between rigidity and flexibility but they do not fully resolve the problem of misaligned reference points. Our experiments also show that contract revision is a more nuanced process than the previous literature has recognized. We find, for example, that it is sometimes better for parties to write a simple (rigid) contract and then revise it ex post if needed, rather than to anticipate and include future contingencies in a (flexible) contract from the outset.

Accountable Authority Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption with White-Box Traceability and Public Auditing in the Cloud

Abstract: As a sophisticated mechanism for secure fine-grained access control, ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a highly promising solution for commercial applications such as cloud computing. However, there still exists one major issue awaiting to be solved, that is, the prevention of key abuse. Most of the existing CP-ABE systems missed this critical functionality, hindering the wide utilization and commercial application of CP-ABE systems to date. In this paper, we address two practical problems about the key abuse of CP-ABE: (1) The key escrow problem of the semi-trusted authority; and, (2) The malicious key delegation problem of the users. For the semi-trusted authority, its misbehavior (i.e., illegal key (re-)distribution) should be caught and prosecuted. And for a user, his/her malicious behavior (i.e., illegal key sharing) need be traced. We affirmatively solve these two key abuse problems by proposing the first accountable authority CP-ABE with white-box traceability that supports policies expressed in any monotone access structures. Moreover, we provide an auditor to judge publicly whether a suspected user is guilty or is framed by the authority.

Delegating private quantum computations12

Abstract: We give a protocol for the delegation of quantum computation on encrypted data. More specifically, we show that in a client–server scenario, where the client holds the encryption key for an encrypt...

Procedure Delegation by Attending Surgeons Performing Concurrent Operations in Academic Medical Centers: Balancing Safety and Efficiency.

Abstract: A ttending surgeons performing concurrent operations in 2 separate rooms with qualified surgical trainees assigned to the individual rooms constitutes a longstanding common practice in academic medical centers. This practice has been increasingly questioned and at times reflexively changed without full consideration of the relevant issues. Although there are minimal data specifically defining the appropriateness of concurrent workflows in academic medical centers, its common practice suggests an assumption of safety. The purported benefits include time and cost-effectiveness as well as provision of incremental responsibility for surgical trainees. We posit that the practice of concurrent surgery, within the confines of strict adherence to certain guiding principles and a continued critical assessment of surgical outcomes, is a means of delivering safe, ethically sound, high quality, and cost-effective care. The vulnerable anesthetized surgical patient places immense trust in his or her surgeon irrespective of trainee involvement, and accordingly the surgeon has a responsibility for the conduct and outcome of the entire procedure. Trainee involvement requires full disclosure to the patient, and academic medical centers should have trainee involvement noted in the anesthesia and operative informed consent documents. Running 2 rooms requires adherence to all safety checkpoints including surgical timeouts. The attending surgeon must recognize the skill sets of involved trainees, provide appropriate supervision, be immediately available for the entire case, be physically present for all critical parts of the procedure, and document this in the medical record. Medicare policy currently allows the teaching physician to be involved in 2 overlapping surgeries provided he or she is present for the critical portions and documents his or her presence during the key portions of the case. In this regard, trainee involvement falls within the scope of procedural delegation. Procedural delegation to subordinate practitioners is widely accepted across all professional environments, with procedures of lesser complexity entrusted to qualified, albeit perhaps less trained personnel. Indeed, were this practice eliminated (eg, requiring attending surgeon placement of peripheral intravenous or urinary catheters), care could not be delivered. This approach remains both appropriate and efficient so long as the attending pays dutiful attention to the competency of the subordinate practitioners, which include specialtytrained advanced practice providers and trainees. In this circumstance, the trainee should clearly be defined as someone who has not yet achieved his or her final level of education, and not as someone who is untrained. For surgical house staff, trainees are all licensed physicians who often, as is the case of a chief resident or fellow in surgery, have more formal training than most attending physicians in other specialties. A surgical resident has, during each year of his or her

Negotiated expertise in policy-making: How governments use hybrid advisory committees

Abstract: By linking the realms of public policy-making, science and the public, advisory committees that include academics, state representatives and societal stakeholders answer to a double challenge that governments face today: a need for technical knowledge and an increasing demand for public acceptance and accountability. In contrast to purely scientific policy advice, little theoretical attention has so far been paid to these hybrid advisory committees. Drawing on and adapting research on knowledge utilisation, theories of delegation, decision-making and governance, an analytical framework of the use of multi-source, negotiated expertise will be developed and applied to four cases set up by the German Federal Government with mandates in social policy and in science and technology policy. The study shows the committees’ pronounced governance potential, which builds on their political and epistemic authority. It describes two distinct dynamics that lend the committees to instrumental, problem solving, and symbolic, substantiating purposes.

The centre strikes back: meta‐governance, delegation, and the core executive in the united kingdom, 2010–14

Abstract: A growing literature on ‘agencification’, ‘quangocratization’, and the ‘autonomization’ of the state has highlighted a coordination dilemma in contemporary public governance whereby governments rely on delegated governance but are frustrated by the lack of control that arises from such structures. In the run-up to the 2010 General Election in the United Kingdom this coordination dilemma was prominent as the capacity of the Cabinet Office to exert control over arm's-length bodies, either directly or indirectly, received intense criticism. This article presents the findings of the first detailed research project to examine the subsequent Coalition Government's approach to this dilemma. It argues that in relation to the governance of public bodies, the role and capacity of the Cabinet Office has been transformed. In mapping this development the article explores the implications of the centre striking back in the context of ‘post-New Public Management’ reforms.

Delegation Within Hierarchies: How Information Processing and Knowledge Characteristics Influence the Allocation of Formal and Real Decision Authority

Abstract: We investigate trade-offs associated with delegating authority over multiple interrelated decisions in a complex task structure. The empirical setting is a business process of a global Fortune 50 firm. The firm decentralized its organization and redefined decision authority across organizational hierarchies between 2008 and 2011. We employ regression analysis of microlevel data on the allocation of decision authority between formal and real authority, and further on the organization design of 761 decision tasks within a hierarchy. Our findings show how the specialization of decision-relevant knowledge, the matching of required knowledge and managers' expertise, and information processing intensity affect a the occurrence of delegation and, b if delegation occurs, how far down the organizational hierarchy authority is delegated. We discuss how these findings complement existing theories on delegation by providing insights into when and how interrelated decisions are delegated across multiple levels of an organizational hierarchy.

Efficient task sub-delegation for crowdsourcing

Abstract: Reputation-based approaches allow a crowdsourcing system to identify reliable workers to whom tasks can be delegated. In crowdsourcing systems that can be modeled as multi-agent trust networks consist of resource constrained trustee agents (i.e., workers), workers may need to further sub-delegate tasks to others if they determine that they cannot complete all pending tasks before the stipulated deadlines. Existing reputation-based decision-making models cannot help workers decide when and to whom to sub-delegate tasks. In this paper, we proposed a reputation aware task sub-delegation (RTS) approach to bridge this gap. By jointly considering a worker's reputation, workload, the price of its effort and its trust relationships with others, RTS can be implemented as an intelligent agent to help workers make sub-delegation decisions in a distributed manner. The resulting task allocation maximizes social welfare through efficient utilization of the collective capacity of a crowd, and provides provable performance guarantees. Experimental comparisons with state-of-the-art approaches based on the Epinions trust network demonstrate significant advantages of RTS under high workload conditions.

The IMF as a de facto institution of the EU: A multiple supervisor approach

Abstract: This paper seeks to understand and explain the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) evolving relationship with the European Union (EU) before and after the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 Prior to this crisis, the two sides operated on parallel tracks with little scope for mutual adjustment even during the economic turmoil of the 1970s After the global financial crisis, the IMF emerged as a de facto institution of the EU thanks to European leaders’ delegation of supervisory powers to both the Fund and the European Commission The reasons for, and consequences of, this dual delegation are explored here by means of amultiple supervisor variation on the classic principal-agent-supervisor approach

A Note on the Optimal Rate of Growth of International Reserves

Abstract: The current reform of the international monetary system rests on the conception that the nominal quantity of external reserves, taken in the aggregate, must provide the flexible element in the adjustment between the supply of, and the demand for, real international liquidity. Carried to its logical conclusion, this principle implies the adoption of a "passive money" system in the international sphere. The nominal quantity of money ceases to be an exogenous datum to which prices and wages must conform and becomes a dependent variable having an equilibrium level.1 The new reserve assets are destined to satisfy the long-run needs for reserve growth.2 Yet, as is well known, the evaluation of such needs presents appreciable difficulties. In itself this estimation problem is not new. It was explicitly discussed in the report of the Gold Delegation appointed in 1929 to examine the trends in the gold demand and supply.' The method used by the Delegation is worth recalling. It is based upon the double assumption that (1) the monetary demand for gold is proportional to the quantity of money, and (2) the demand for money is proportional to the aggregate value of transactions. The second part of this hypothesis reflects, obviously, the Quantity Theory in its classical form. The first part expresses instead an institutional situation: in those years the countries under the Gold Standard used to maintain, by virtue of law or of convention, a margin of gold cover against the total amount of notes and of central bank sight liabilities. The combination of the two ratios led the delegation to estimate the need for gold reserves as a fixed proportion of the total value of transactions.

Accountable Authority Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption with White-Box Traceability and Public Auditing in the Cloud.

Abstract: As a sophisticated mechanism for secure fine-grained access control, ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a highly promising solution for commercial applications such as cloud computing. However, there still exists one major issue awaiting to be solved, that is, the prevention of key abuse. Most of the existing CP-ABE systems missed this critical functionality, hindering the wide utilization and commercial application of CP-ABE systems to date. In this paper, we address two practical problems about the key abuse of CP-ABE: (1) The key escrow problem of the semi-trusted authority; and, (2) The malicious key delegation problem of the users. For the semi-trusted authority, its misbehavior (i.e., illegal key (re-)distribution) should be caught and prosecuted. And for a user, his/her malicious behavior (i.e., illegal key sharing) need be traced. We affirmatively solve these two key abuse problems by proposing the first accountable authority CP-ABE with whitebox traceability that supports policies expressed in any monotone access structures. Moreover, we provide an auditor to judge publicly whether a suspected user is guilty or is framed by the authority.

Flow-Limited Authorization

Abstract: Because information flow control mechanisms often rely on an underlying authorization mechanism, their security guarantees can be subverted by weaknesses in authorization. Conversely, the security of authorization can be subverted by information flows that leak information or that influence how authority is delegated between principals. We argue that interactions between information flow and authorization create security vulnerabilities that have not been fully identified or addressed in prior work. We explore how the security of decentralized information flow control (DIFC) is affected by three aspects of its underlying authorization mechanism: first, delegation of authority between principals, second, revocation of previously delegated authority, third, information flows created by the authorization mechanisms themselves. It is no surprise that revocation poses challenges, but we show that even delegation is problematic because it enables unauthorized downgrading. Our solution is a new security model, the Flow-Limited Authorization Model (FLAM), which offers a new, integrated approach to authorization and information flow control. FLAM ensures robust authorization, a novel security condition for authorization queries that ensures attackers cannot influence authorization decisions or learn confidential trust relationships. We discuss our prototype implementation and its algorithm for proof search.

The Single Resolution Mechanism in the European Banking Union: Legal foundation, governance structure and financing

Abstract: This paper analyses the most critical legal, institutional and governance issues underpinning the establishment of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) which constitutes the second pillar of the European Banking Union. The architecture of the SRM combines a centralized model, where important powers are exercised at the EU level, with a decentralized execution of decisions carried out by the national authorities. The paper examines first, the legal and institutional foundations of the SRM which were of paramount importance during the negotiations for its establishment, since the EU Treaties did not explicitly provide for powers for the resolution of banks. Second, it analyses the complex governance structure, including the decision-making mechanism for the placement of a bank under resolution which is entrusted to the Single Resolution Board (SRB), an EU agency, enjoying significant powers. Finally, it assesses the role of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) which will be endowed with EUR 55 Billion for the financing of resolution actions, and its relationship with the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).The authors review critically the structure of the SRM decision-making process, where a number of other actors are involved (ECB, Commission, ESM), in terms of: a) efficiency, as the declared objective of the SRM is the adoption of ‘efficient, effective and speedy resolution decisions’ that need to be taken within a very tight time frame, frequently overnight and which will have far-reaching economic and legal consequences; b) legal certainty, as the new edifice should be resilient to legal challenges against its legal basis or/and the delegation of powers to the SRB; and c) political legitimacy, as EU institutions should represent the European (and not national) interest and should be accountable when carrying out and implementing fundamental EU policies, such as in the field of resolution. The authors conclude that while the adoption of the SRM constitutes an important step towards the completion of the European Banking Union, some improvements, under the current EU institutional framework, may be necessary regarding, e.g. the reinforcement of the SRF financial capacity, the SRM decision-making process, the role of the ESM, the advancement of a certain form of a European Deposit Guarantee System. The increasing burden-sharing triggered by these financing mechanisms makes necessary the advancement towards the European Fiscal Union, which is indispensable for the credibility and sustainability of the European Banking Union.

Voting Behaviour and Power in Online Democracy: A Study of LiquidFeedback in Germany's Pirate Party

Abstract: In recent years, political parties have adopted Online Delegative Democracy platforms such as LiquidFeedback to organise themselves and their political agendas via a grassroots approach. A common objection against the use of these platforms is the delegation system, where a user can delegate his vote to another user, giving rise to so-called super-voters, i.e. powerful users who receive many delegations. It has been asserted in the past that the presence of these super-voters undermines the democratic process, and therefore delegative democracy should be avoided. In this paper, we look at the emergence of super-voters in the largest delegative online democracy platform worldwide, operated by Germany’s Pirate Party. We investigate the distribution of power within the party systematically, study whether super-voters exist, and explore the influence they have on the outcome of votings conducted online. While we find that the theoretical power of super-voters is indeed high, we also observe that they use their power wisely. Super-voters do not fully act on their power to change the outcome of votes, but they vote in favour of proposals with the majority of voters in many cases thereby exhibiting a stabilising effect on the system. We use these findings to present a novel class of power indices that considers observed voting biases and gives significantly better predictions than state-of-the-art measures.

Risk Mitigation, Regime Security, and Militias: Beyond Coup-proofing

Abstract: In Thailand, India, Libya, and elsewhere, governments arm the populace or call up volunteers in irregular armed groups despite the risks this entails. The widespread presence of these militias, outside the context of state failure, challenges the expectation that governments uniformly consolidate the tools of violence. Drawing on the logic of delegation, we resolve this puzzle by arguing that governments have multiple incentives to form armed groups with a recognized link to the state but outside of the regular security forces. Such groups offset coup risks as substitutes for unreliable regular forces. Similar to other public-private collaborations, they also complement the work of regular forces in providing efficiency and information gains. Finally, these groups distance the government from the controversial use of force. These traits suggest that militias are not simply a sign of failed states or a precursor to a national military, but an important component of security portfolios in many contexts. Using cross-national data (1981–2005), we find support for this mix of incentives. From the perspective of delegation, used to analyze organizational design, global accountability, and policy choices, the domestic and international incentives for governments to choose militias raise explicit governance and accountability issues for the international community.

Alternative scenarios: harnessing mid-level providers and evidence-based practice in primary dental care in England through operational research

Abstract: In primary care dentistry, strategies to reconfigure the traditional boundaries of various dental professional groups by task sharing and role substitution have been encouraged in order to meet changing oral health needs. The aim of this research was to investigate the potential for skill mix use in primary dental care in England based on the undergraduate training experience in a primary care team training centre for dentists and mid-level dental providers. An operational research model and four alternative scenarios to test the potential for skill mix use in primary care in England were developed, informed by the model of care at a primary dental care training centre in the south of England, professional policy including scope of practice and contemporary evidence-based preventative practice. The model was developed in Excel and drew on published national timings and salary costs. The scenarios included the following: “No Skill Mix”, “Minimal Direct Access”, “More Prevention” and “Maximum Delegation”. The scenario outputs comprised clinical time, workforce numbers and salary costs required for state-funded primary dental care in England. The operational research model suggested that 73% of clinical time in England’s state-funded primary dental care in 2011/12 was spent on tasks that may be delegated to dental care professionals (DCPs), and 45- to 54-year-old patients received the most clinical time overall. Using estimated National Health Service (NHS) clinical working patterns, the model suggested alternative NHS workforce numbers and salary costs to meet the dental demand based on each developed scenario. For scenario 1:“No Skill Mix”, the dentist-only scenario, 81% of the dentists currently registered in England would be required to participate. In scenario 2: “Minimal Direct Access”, where 70% of examinations were delegated and the primary care training centre delegation patterns for other treatments were practised, 40% of registered dentists and eight times the number of dental therapists currently registered would be required; this would save 38% of current salary costs cf. “No Skill Mix”. Scenario 3: “More Prevention”, that is, the current model with no direct access and increasing fluoride varnish from 13.1% to 50% and maintaining the same model of delegation as scenario 2 for other care, would require 57% of registered dentists and 4.7 times the number of dental therapists. It would achieve a 1% salary cost saving cf. “No Skill Mix”. Scenario 4 “Maximum Delegation” where all care within dental therapists’ jurisdiction is delegated at 100%, together with 50% of restorations and radiographs, suggested that only 30% of registered dentists would be required and 10 times the number of dental therapists registered; this scenario would achieve a 52% salary cost saving cf. “No Skill Mix”. Alternative scenarios based on wider expressed treatment need in national primary dental care in England, changing regulations on the scope of practice and increased evidence-based preventive practice suggest that the majority of care in primary dental practice may be delegated to dental therapists, and there is potential time and salary cost saving if the majority of diagnostic tasks and prevention are delegated. However, this would require an increase in trained DCPs, including role enhancement, as part of rebalancing the dental workforce.

Strengthening International Courts: The Hidden Costs of Legalization

Abstract: As all manner of commerce becomes increasingly global, states must establish laws to protect property rights, human rights, and national security. In many cases, states delegate authority to resolve disputes regarding these laws to an independent court, whose power depends upon its ability to enforce its rulings. Examining detailed case studies of the International Court of Justice and the transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to the World Trade Organization, Leslie Johns finds that a courtAEs design has nuanced and mixed effects on international cooperation. A strong court is ideal when laws are precise and the court is nested within a political structure like the European Union. Strong courts encourage litigation but make states more likely to comply with agreements when compliance is easy and withdraw from agreements when it is difficult. A weak court is optimal when law is imprecise and states can easily exit agreements with minimal political or economic repercussions. Johns concludes the book with recommendations for promoting cooperation by creating more precise international laws and increasing both delegation and obligation to international courts.

Price Delegation and Performance Pay: Evidence from Industrial Sales Forces

Abstract: Delegation is a central feature of organizational design that theory suggests should be aligned with the intensity of incentives in performance pay schemes. We explore a specific form of delegation, namely price delegation, whereby firms allow sales people to offer a maximum discount from the list price to their customers. We first develop a model of the price delegation decision based on the notions of information acquisition and constrained delegation that match the context of industrial sales. Using data on individual sales people, specifically one sales person per firm from a survey of 261 firms, we show that, consistent with predictions from our model, sales people are given more pricing authority when they are more experienced and more capable, when there is less environmental uncertainty, and to a lesser extent, when customer valuations for the product are more variable. Finally, also consistent with the predictions of our model, we show that price delegation is increasing in the intensity of incentives given to the agent.