Institute for the Study of Labor

About: Institute for the Study of Labor is a nonprofit organization based out in Bonn, Germany. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Wage & Unemployment. The organization has 2039 authors who have published 13475 publications receiving 439376 citations.

Technological Change and Wages: An Inter-Industry Analysis

Abstract: Previous research has found evidence that wages in industries characterized as "high tech," or subject to higher rates of technological change, are higher. In addition, there is evidence that skill-biased technological change is responsible for the dramatic increase in the earnings of more educated workers relative to less educated workers that took place during the 1980s. In this paper, we match a variety of industry level measures of technological change to a panel of young workers observed between 1979 and 1993 (NLSY) and examine the role played by unobserved heterogeneity in explaining the positive relationships between technological change and wages and between technological change and the education premium. We find evidence that the wage premium associated with technological change is primarily due to the sorting of better workers into those industries. In addition, the education premium associated with technological change is found to be the result of an increase in demand for the innate ability or other unobservable characteristics of more educated workers.

The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control

Abstract: When there are binding price controls, there are shortages and the allocation of goods across consumers may not be efficient. In general, the misallocation costs of price controls are first order, while the classic welfare losses due to undersupply are second order. This paper presents an empirical methodology for estimating the degree of misallocation of housing units due to rent control in New York City. This methodology involves comparing the relative consumption of different demographic groups within the rent controlled area with the relative levels of consumption in a free market area. Our best estimate of the costs of rent control in New York due to the misallocation of rental apartments is 200 dollars per apartment annually.

Life Expectancy and Economic Growth: The Role of the Demographic Transition

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the causal effect of life expectancy on economic growth by explicitly accounting for the role of the demographic transition. In addition to focusing on issues of empirical identification, this paper emphasizes the role of the econometric specification. We present a simple theory of the economic and demographic transition where individuals' education and fertility decisions depend on their life expectancy. The theory predicts that before the demographic transition improvements in life expectancy primarily increase population. Improvements in life expectancy do, however, reduce population growth and foster human capital accumulation after the onset of the demographic transition. This implies that the effect of life expectancy on population, human capital and income per capita is not the same before and after the demographic transition. Moreover, a sufficiently high life expectancy is ultimately the trigger of the transition to sustained income growth. We provide evidence supporting these predictions using data on exogenous mortality reductions in the context of the epidemiological revolution.

The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?

Abstract: As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank – are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.

Labor and the Market Value of the Firm

Abstract: What role does labor play in firms' market value? We explore this question using a production-based asset pricing model with frictions in the adjustment of both capital and labor. We posit that hiring of labor is akin to investment in capital and that the two interact, with the interaction being a crucial determinant of market value behavior. We use aggregate U.S. corporate sector data to estimate firms' optimal hiring and investment decisions and the consequences for firms' value. We then decompose this value, thereby quantifying the link between firms' market value and gross hiring flows, employment, gross investment and physical capital. We find that a conventional specification - quadratic adjustment costs for capital and no hiring costs - performs poorly. Rather hiring and investment flows, unlike employment and capital stocks, are volatile and both are essential to account for market volatility. A key result is that firms' value embodies the value of hiring and investment over and above the capital stock.