Journal ArticleDOI
Risk as feelings.
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TLDR
This article proposed the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, which highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making, and showed that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks.Abstract:
Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.read more
Citations
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The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
TL;DR: The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached.
Journal ArticleDOI
Gender Differences in Preferences
Rachel Croson,Uri Gneezy +1 more
TL;DR: This paper reviewed the literature on gender differences in economic experiments and identified robust differences in risk preferences, social (other-regarding) preferences, and competitive preferences, speculating on the source of these differences and their implications.
Journal ArticleDOI
A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality.
TL;DR: Determinants and consequences of accessibility help explain the central results of prospect theory, framing effects, the heuristic process of attribute substitution, and the characteristic biases that result from the substitution of nonextensional for extensional attributes.
Journal ArticleDOI
Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics
TL;DR: Kahneman as mentioned in this paper made a statement based on worked out together with Shane Federik the quirkiness of human judgment, which was later used in his speech at the Nobel Prize in economics.
Book
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
TL;DR: In this article, a review is presented of the book "Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman".
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Mental Simulations, Affect, and Subjective Confidence: Timing Is Everything
TL;DR: The authors found that mental simulations and affect are related to temporal changes in subjective confidence and negative affect, and that negative affect correlated negatively with upward simulations (i.e., simulations that are better than reality).
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Risk perception by patients with anxiety disorders.
Randolph M. Nesse,Richard Klaas +1 more
TL;DR: Cognitive estimates of specific risks are normal in patients with anxiety disorders, and the hypothesis that anxiety disorders might result from excessively objective risk assessments is tested.
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Salivation: the significance of imagery in its voluntary control.
TL;DR: Using the sublingual cotton swab technique it was shown that salivation can be controlled by practitioners and non‐practitioners of transcendental meditation and the suggestion was made that self‐generated imagery could be important for the control, and in the conditioning, of other autonomic effectors.
Journal ArticleDOI
Timing contradictions in von Neumann and Morgenstern's axioms and in savage's ‘sure-thing’ proof
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that the validity of Savage's "sure-thing" proof cannot be retrieved by minimizing N > 0, by making the delay a mere moment or so.