London School of Economics and Political Science

About: London School of Economics and Political Science is a education organization based out in London, United Kingdom. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Politics & Population. The organization has 8759 authors who have published 35017 publications receiving 1436302 citations.

Evolutionary Theory and the Ultimate–Proximate Distinction in the Human Behavioral Sciences

Abstract: To properly understand behavior, we must obtain both ultimate and proximate explanations. Put briefly, ultimate explanations are concerned with why a behavior exists, and proximate explanations are concerned with how it works. These two types of explanation are complementary and the distinction is critical to evolutionary explanation. We are concerned that they have become conflated in some areas of the evolutionary literature on human behavior. This article brings attention to these issues. We focus on three specific areas: the evolution of cooperation, transmitted culture, and epigenetics. We do this to avoid confusion and wasted effort-dangers that are particularly acute in interdisciplinary research. Throughout this article, we suggest ways in which misunderstanding may be avoided in the future.

Winners and losers from regional integration agreements

Abstract: How are the benefits and costs of a customs union divided between member countries? Outcomes depend on the comparative advantage of members, relative to each other and relative to the rest of the world. Countries with a comparative advantage between that of their partners and the rest of the world do better than countries with an ‘extreme’ comparative advantage. Consequently, integration between low income countries tends to lead to divergence of member country incomes, while agreements between high income countries cause convergence. Results suggest that developing countries are likely to be better served by ‘north-south’ than by ‘south-south’ agreements.

Quantifying the Black Economy: ‘measurement Without Theory’ Yet Again?

Abstract: I shall argue that 'measurement without theory' is a fair description of the published empirical work aimed at guestimating the size of the 'hidden' or 'black economy'.' I shall also argue that a mere guestimate of the overall size of the black economy is of limited value for the policy maker; it is also important to know who is doing what, where, how and why. Then we can see what should and/or can be done about legislating for or against the black economy. In assessing the various attempts to measure the size of the black economy, one should also be aware of a political dimension to some of this work. Perhaps a large and growing black economy is an indication that the economy is overtaxed and over-regulated and a neo-liberal adjustment is needed to free it up? If a large part of the black economy is social security fraud, then maybe unemployment is not really as bad as it looks? Clearly such political conclusions depended on having good theoretical as well as sound quantitative foundations and both these components were generally missing.

Innovation and Foreign Ownership

Abstract: 1 Many have argued that this is because multinationals transfer superior technologies and organizational practices—in the form of new product and process innovation—to their foreign subsidiaries. 2 However, since the most prevalent form of multinational entry is through acquisition (89 percent of FDI flows in developed countries—Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004), rather than through greenfield investment, their superior performance could be due to the selection of higher-performing domestic firms. To date, little is known about the economic determinants of which domestic firms are selected to become foreign subsidiaries and the extent to which newly acquired subsidiaries increase their productivity by innovating—introducing technologies that are new to that firm. In this article, we use a unique panel dataset to analyze both the selection and innovation decisions of multinational firms. We propose a new mechanism to explain how these decisions are jointly determined, highlighting how the market access provided by multinationals creates incentives for subsidiary innovation and, hence, acquisition. We argue that one cannot fully understand the relationship between for