London School of Economics and Political Science

About: London School of Economics and Political Science is a education organization based out in London, United Kingdom. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Politics & Population. The organization has 8759 authors who have published 35017 publications receiving 1436302 citations.

Why China's economic reforms differ: the M-form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector

Abstract: China's thirteen years of economic reforms (1979-1991) have achieved an average GNP annual growth rate of 8.6%. What makes China's reforms differ from those of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is the sustained entry and expansion of the non-state sector. We argue that the organization structure of the economy matters. Unlike their unitary hierarchical structure based on functional or specialization principles (the U-form), China's hierarchical economy has been the multi-layer-multi-regional one mainly based on territorial principle (the deep M-form, or briefly, the M-form). Reforms have further decentralized the M-form economy along regional lines, which provided flexibility and opportunities for carrying out regional experiments, for the rise of non-state enterprises, and for the emergence of markets. This is why China's non-state sector share of industrial output increased from 22% in 1978 to 47% in 1991 and its private sector's share from zero to about 10%, both being achieved without mass privatization and changes in the political system.

Data Colonialism: Rethinking Big Data’s Relation to the Contemporary Subject:

Abstract: We are often told that data are the new oil But unlike oil, data are not a substance found in nature It must be appropriated The capture and processing of social data unfolds through a process w

Contemporary public management: a new global paradigm?:

Abstract: This paper takes another look at the much-canvassed idea of a 'new global paradigm' emerging in contemporary public management. It argues that, linguistic usage apart, the 'globality' and monoparadigmatic character of contemporary public management change seems to be exaggerated. Three interrelated objections are advanced against the claim of an emerging new global paradigm. First, it is argued that contemporary reform ideas, particularly those advanced by Osborne and Gaebler, are culturally plural rather than homogenous. Second, it is argued that there are substantial biases towards exaggerating international similarity in public management reforms, but that the similarity weakens when we go beyond semantic packaging to examine the specific content of reform initiatives. Third, it is claimed that there are also built- in biases for overstressing the continuity of contemporary public management reforms, but that in fact there are major obstacles to the emergence of a stable new paradigm in public manageme...

The Wrong Kind of Transparency

Abstract: In a model of career concerns for experts, when is a principal hurt from observing more information about their agent? This Paper introduces a distinction between information on the consequence of the agent's action and information directly on the agent's action When the latter kind of information is available, the agent faces an incentive to disregard useful private signals and act according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori This conformist behaviour hurts the principal in two ways: the decision made by the agent is less likely to be the right one (discipline) and ex post it is more difficult to evaluate the agent's ability (sorting) The Paper identifies a necessary and sufficient condition on the agent signal structure under which transparency on action is detrimental to the principal The Paper also shows the existence of complementarities between transparency on action and transparency on consequence The results on the distinction between transparency on action and transparency on consequence are then used to interpret existing disclosure policies in politics, corporate governance, and delegated portfolio management

The open method as a new mode of governance: the case of soft economic policy co-ordination

Abstract: Taking economic co-ordination in EMU as a starting point, this article explores the development of the open method of co-ordination, addressing whether it is a new form of governance from two related perspectives. First, to what extent can the method be effectively applied outside the scope of economic policy? Second, will it lead to policy transfer to the EU and hence act only as a transitional mode of governance? Identified at the Lisbon European Council, the method codified practices such as benchmarking, target-setting and peer review developed in the Luxembourg, Cardiff and Cologne processes. The method offers a new approach to governance of the EU as a heterarchical, decentred and dynamic process. It supports and radicalizes the principle of subsidiarity; offers an alternative to the treaty rules on enhanced co-operation; and addresses some of the legitimacy issues inherent in the EU. In EMU, the method arose out of a specific policy framework with a common monetary policy complemented by the coordination of national economic policies. The recent recommendation issued against Ireland is the first example of the operation of the method in EMU and shows how debate can be stimulated and how different and arguably equally valid perspectives defended. The particular experience of EMU with a sound money, sound finance paradigm, a long history of project-building by key elites and the central role of the European Council suggest similar conditions are required for the effective application of the method in other policy spheres. The context within which the method has operated to date is contingent and could change either over time or between policy fields. If so, the very openness of the method may serve to reconfigure the boundaries of competence between the Member States and the Union, after all.