How can higher-yield farming help to spare nature?
Ben Phalan (1),*, Rhys E. Green (1),(2), Lynn V. Dicks (1), Graziela Dotta (3),
Claire Feniuk (1), Anthony Lamb (1), Bernardo B. N. Strassburg (4), (5), David R.
Williams (1), Erasmus K. H. J. zu Ermgassen (1), Andrew Balmford (1)
(1) Conservation Science Group, Department of Zoology, University of Cambridge, Cambridge
CB2 3EJ, UK.
(2) RSPB Centre for Conservation Science, Royal Society for the Prote">2RSPB Centre for
Conservation Science, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, Sandy SG19 2DL, UK.
(3) Laboratório de Ornitologia, Museu de Ciências e Tecnologia, PUC-RS, 6681, Porto Alegre,
Brazil.
(4) International Institute for Sustainability, 22460-320 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
(5) Rio Conservation and Sustainability Science Centre, Department of Geography and the
Environment, Pontifícia Universidade Católica, 22453-900 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
*Corresponding author. E-mail: btp22@cam.ac.uk
Expansion of land area used for agriculture is a leading cause of biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas
emissions, particularly in the tropics. One potential way to reduce these impacts is to increase food
production per unit area (yield) on existing farmland, so as to minimize farmland area and to spare
land for habitat conservation or restoration. There is now widespread evidence that such a strategy
could benefit a large proportion of wild species, provided that spared land is conserved as natural
habitat (1). However, the scope for yield growth to spare land by lowering food prices and, hence,
incentives for clearance (“passive” land sparing) can be undermined if lower prices stimulate
demand and if higher yields raise profits, encouraging agricultural expansion and increasing the
opportunity cost of conservation (2, 3). We offer a first description of four categories of “active”
land-sparing mechanisms that could overcome these rebound effects by linking yield increases with
habitat protection or restoration (table S1). The effectiveness, limitations, and potential for
unintended consequences of these mechanisms have yet to be systematically tested, but in each
case, we describe real-world interventions that illustrate how intentional links between yield
increases and land sparing might be developed.
FOUR LINKING MECHANISMS. Land-use zoning. Zoning some land for conservation and some for
agriculture limits agricultural expansion, provides security to landholders investing in agricultural
productivity, and can incentivize yield increases to compensate for the scarcity of available land
[“Boserupian innovation” (4)]. However, zoning does not drive yield increases in agricultural zones
directly. Hence, there is a risk of its leading to displacement of production outside the regions
subject to zoning. Such “leakage” might be less likely where zoning restrictions are placed on the
expansion of export commodities for which demand shows high price elasticity, rather than on
staple foods (2).
In Costa Rica, after the government zoned forests as off-limits for agricultural expansion, the rate of
clearance of mature forests halved (5). Export-oriented agriculture shifted from cattle pasture
toward high-yielding pineapple and banana crop, (for fuller information and references for this and
other case studies, see supplementary materials (SM). Beef production declined, albeit temporarily,
whereas production of pineapples and other crops has continued to increase. The risk of leakage
could be reduced by prioritizing lessproductive land for conservation to minimize loss of production
and by combining zoning with other interventions (6).
Economic instruments, such as payments, land taxes, and subsidies. In principle, these can be
tailored to stimulate yield increases, discourage habitat conversion, and make receipt of benefits
conditional on habitat conservation. Incentive programs often involve contracts, and difficulties can
arise through hidden actions and information asymmetries. For example, recipients might conceal
breaches of contract or accept money for actions they would have carried out anyway. These risks
can be reduced by building trust, understanding the people and places where interventions occur,
developing cost-effective monitoring, and enforcing contracts.
An incentive program that has successfully spared land has been implemented in the Spiti Valley of
Himalayan India (7). In exchange for designating land set-asides for the recovery of snow leopard
prey, herders receive payments and technical assistance to reduce livestock losses to snow leopards
(improving yield) and to organize insurance against losses. The program, which was developed
collaboratively with herders and local government to ensure that it addresses local priorities,
reduced snow leopard predation of livestock by two-thirds in its first 4 years and eliminated snow
leopard killings.
Spatially strategic deployment of technology, infrastructure, or agronomic knowledge. Land sparing
can be encouraged if yield-enhancing measures (such as technical advice on soil, nutrient, or water
management; improved germplasm; multiple cropping; integrated pest and disease control; and
improved access to roads or irrigation) are intentionally directed toward certain areas and not
others. Such interventions could enhance yields and reduce post-harvest losses in established
farmlands, while avoiding the risks involved in stimulating agriculture in areas of extensive natural
habitat (8). Increasing yields of staple crops, for which demand is inelastic to price changes, appears
more likely to support land sparing than increasing yields of luxury or export crops (2). A limitation of
strategic deployment is that it encourages yield increases directly but only protects natural habitats
indirectly, by reducing pressure for conversion. It will often be necessary to combine this mechanism
with others, especially land-use zoning. A key challenge is to ensure that benefits and costs are not
unfairly distributed.
In the Philippine province of Palawan, introduction of irrigation helped lowland rice farmers produce
two crops per year rather than one (9). They met their higher labor demands by employing upland
farmers, who used part of their new-found income to invest in fertilizers, which improved their own
yields and reduced their need to clear forests. Deforestation rates in the uplands halved. Larger and
poorer households were those most likely to benefit. Nevertheless, addressing social justice remains
practically and ethically complex, is often hampered by unequal power relations and may often
require additional measures, such as increasing nonagricultural job opportunities for marginalized
groups.
Standards and certification. Voluntary standards could link yield growth to conservation by requiring
habitat protection, defining sustainable yield-increasing practices, monitoring compliance, and
rewarding good performance with market access and price premiums. Sparing or restoring natural
habitats at farm scale can be more beneficial for biodiversity than certifying lower-yielding “wildlife-
friendly” practices (10). To maximize their contribution to landscape-level conservation, certification
schemes should widen their focus from individual farms to coordinated actions by groups of farmers
in places where potential conservation gains are greatest.
Participating farmers in the Ibis rice scheme in northern Cambodia receive technical assistance and a
price premium, which makes it easier to afford simple technology and additional labor (11). At the
same time, they agree to a village-level land-use plan that protects habitats. These agreements are
maintained in part by social pressure: A major infraction would put everyone's benefits at risk.
Together with other initiatives, the scheme has reduced deforestation and increased rice harvests. It
illustrates one way of making landscape conservation relevant and feasible for individual farmers.
CONDITIONS AND SYNERGIES. Some conditions make successful implementation of land-sparing
mechanisms more likely. Labor- and capital-intensive technologies and practices are those most
likely to be conducive to land sparing (8). Knowledge networks can also help improve
implementation of sustainability standards or payment schemes (12). For example, thousands of
Landcare groups in Australia share knowledge on accessing funds, conserving habitats, and
improving agricultural techniques. Landcare participants are more likely to protect and restore
native vegetation and to adopt practices that sustain agricultural yields (13). Markets also matter.
For commodities with globalized markets and elastic demand, limiting rebound effects through
demand-side measures and restrictions on land use will be crucial. In the case of staples grown by
smallholders, supporting them to increase their yields (and thereby, limit leakage) might be more
appropriate.
Each mechanism is most likely to be effective if implemented in synergy with others, so that strong
protection is provided to habitats and adequate support is provided to farmers to increase their
yields. Command-and-control zoning policies will more likely be accepted as legitimate if
accompanied by incentives, improved access to technology and infrastructure, and knowledge-
sharing (14). Because of the risk of rebound effects, strategic deployment will often have to be
integrated with mechanisms, such as zoning, that apply over large areas. Environmental and
agricultural policies need to be coordinated to work in synergy rather than in conflict.
Brazil provides an example of how multiple policy interventions can work together. Natural habitats
are conserved through several instruments including protected areas, indigenous reserves, and
Forest Code requirements on private lands (15). Government-subsidized loans are provided to
farmers to increase productivity on degraded pastureland. Partly due to these initiatives, and
despite widespread noncompliance with the Forest Code, deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon
declined steeply after 2004, whereas agricultural production continued to grow.
Whether these trends can be sustained and replicated elsewhere will depend largely on the political
will to deliver strong environmental governance. There is a risk that environmental regulations will
be corrupted or diluted by powerful special interests, as happened in Europe with the Common
Agricultural Policy (16). Further efforts to reduce habitat loss must do so while safeguarding the
interests of smallholders, as agricultural credit programs in Brazil seek to do by supporting family
farms. In many parts of the world, higher yields have eroded not only on-farm biodiversity but also
water, soil, and air quality. Much remains to be done to reduce these impacts by applying improved
agronomic and agroecological knowledge (17).
Harnessing the potential of higher-yield farming to make space for nature at scales that matter will
not be straightforward, but the examples described here illustrate that it can be done. The challenge
is to move on from thinking about higher yields simply as a means to produce more food and to use
them to free up land for conserving biodiversity and ecosystem services. Reconciling agriculture and
conservation is one of this century's greatest challenges. We hope that by describing some
promising solutions, we can stimulate the proposal, testing, and application of many more.
Supplementary Materials
www.sciencemag/content/351/6272/450/suppl/DC1
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Acknowledgments: We thank T. Gardner, M. Fagan, A. John, A. Mould, G. Shively, E. Beauchamp, C.
Mishra, T. Clements, N. Selva, and three anonymous reviewers for comments. Funding: Zukerman
fellowship, King's College, Cambridge (B.P.); Natural Environment Research Council NE/K015419/1
(L.V.D.); Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation and Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
(B.B.N.S.); Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council BB/J014540/1 (E.K.H.J.z.E.).