Institution
HEC Paris
Education•Jouy-en-Josas, France•
About: HEC Paris is a education organization based out in Jouy-en-Josas, France. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Investment (macroeconomics) & Market liquidity. The organization has 584 authors who have published 2756 publications receiving 104467 citations. The organization is also known as: Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales & HEC School of Management Paris.
Topics: Investment (macroeconomics), Market liquidity, Corporate governance, Entrepreneurship, Portfolio
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors evaluate a decade of this regulation and examine how it affected the behavior of shareholders and boards in a sample of Financial Times Stock Exchange 350 firms during the period 2002-2012.
Abstract: In 2002, the UK adopted a regulation allowing shareholders to cast non-binding (advisory) votes on their firm's Directors' Remuneration Report during annual general meetings (the ‘Say-on-Pay’ rule). This study evaluates a decade of this regulation and examines how it affected the behavior of shareholders and boards in a sample of Financial Times Stock Exchange 350 firms during the period 2002–2012. I find evidence that shareholder dissatisfaction increases with excess Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation. This relationship does not exist for the expected level of compensation, suggesting that shareholders take a sophisticated approach when casting their vote. Boards do not appear to respond to shareholder dissatisfaction systematically; however, they do respond selectively by reducing the excessiveness of CEO compensation when performance is poor. Boards also seem to respond swiftly to shareholder dissatisfaction. There is evidence that the probability of CEO turnover increases with sharehol...
62 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, a focus group analysis of managers' sentiments on corporate social action (CSA) was conducted to understand how cultural beliefs in the virtues of liberalism affect the likelihood of greenwashing.
Abstract: Previous literature has shown contradictory results regarding the relationship between economic liberalism at the country level and firms’ engagement in corporate social action (CSA). Because liberalism is associated with individualism, it is often assumed that firms will engage in mostly symbolic rather than substantive social and environmental actions; in other words, they will practice “greenwashing.” To understand how cultural beliefs in the virtues of liberalism affect the likelihood of greenwashing, we disentangle the effects of the distinct and co-existing beliefs in the virtues of economic liberalism. We begin by conducting an exploratory qualitative analysis of managers’ sentiments on this matter, based on a focus group methodology. We then use these investigative elements to articulate a comparison of the conflicting theoretical arguments: in liberal contexts, are firms, as social entities, inherently selfish or pro-active when it comes to CSA? We empirically test our hypotheses on a large-scale dataset. Finally, we show paradoxically that in countries where beliefs in the virtues of competition are strong, firms are more likely to greenwash, while in countries where beliefs in the virtues of individual responsibility are prominent, firms are more likely to focus on concrete actions. These findings suggest that in contexts where weak governments are seen as ideal, firms might feel the need to step into fill institutional voids, in contexts in which competitive mindsets dominate, this tendency is counterbalanced.
62 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that a significant proportion of the labour force is not covered by efficient labour contracts, and that the nonexistence of forward labour contracts limits the opportunity of efficient risk-sharing through private arrangements among young labour-suppliers and capital-owners.
62 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed price competition between dealers in a security market where the bidding process is sequential and provided an interpretation for the evolution of the best ask and bid prices, in between transactions.
62 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine 227 alliances between competitors in Asia, North America, and Europe and identify two types of alliances: scale alliances and link alliances, where the partner firms contribute similar resources, and link alliance in which the partners contribute complementary resources.
Abstract: Our study addresses two main questions: First, what types of alliances do firms tend to create when combining different kinds of resources? Second, what governance mechanisms do firms set up to coordinate and protect resources when they use them for different alliances? We examine 227 alliances between competitors in Asia, North America, and Europe. We first identify two types of alliances: scale alliances in which the partner firms contribute similar resources, and link alliances in which the partners contribute complementary resources. We find that firms contributing R&D and production resources tend to form scale alliances, while firms contributing marketing resources tend to enter into link alliances. We also find that firms are more likely to choose stronger protection mechanisms for link alliances, which create greater appropriation risks, while they tend to seek higher levels of coordination in scale alliances.
61 citations
Authors
Showing all 605 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
Sandor Czellar | 133 | 1263 | 91049 |
Jean-Yves Reginster | 110 | 1195 | 58146 |
Pierre Hansen | 78 | 575 | 32505 |
Gilles Laurent | 77 | 264 | 27052 |
Olivier Bruyère | 72 | 579 | 24788 |
David Dubois | 50 | 169 | 12396 |
Rodolphe Durand | 49 | 173 | 10075 |
Itzhak Gilboa | 49 | 259 | 13352 |
Yves Dallery | 47 | 170 | 6373 |
Duc Khuong Nguyen | 47 | 235 | 8639 |
Eric Jondeau | 45 | 155 | 7088 |
Jean-Noël Kapferer | 45 | 151 | 12264 |
David Thesmar | 41 | 161 | 7242 |
Bruno Biais | 41 | 144 | 8936 |
Barbara B. Stern | 40 | 89 | 6001 |