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Institution

HEC Paris

EducationJouy-en-Josas, France
About: HEC Paris is a education organization based out in Jouy-en-Josas, France. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Investment (macroeconomics) & Market liquidity. The organization has 584 authors who have published 2756 publications receiving 104467 citations. The organization is also known as: Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales & HEC School of Management Paris.


Papers
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Erik Theissen1
01 Jan 1999
TL;DR: In this paper, an analysis of the bid-ask spreads reveals that the electronic trading system is relatively less attractive for less liquid stocks and that the adverse selection component of the spread is larger.
Abstract: The last decade has witnessed a dramatic increase in both the number and the market share of screen-based trading systems. Electronic trading systems do offer lower operating costs and the possiblilty of remote access to the market. On the other hand, arguments based on the anonymity of electronic trading systems suggest that adverse selection may be a more severe problem and that, therefore, bid-ask spreads may be higher. The present paper addresses the issue of transaction costs in floor and computerized trading systems empirically. In Germany, floor and screen trading for the same stocks exist in parallel. Both markets are liquid and operate simultaneously for several hours each day. An analysis of the bid-ask spreads reveals that the electronic trading system is relatively less attractive for less liquid stocks. The market shares of the competing systems reveal a similar pattern. The market share of the electronic trading system is negatively related to the total trading volume of the stock, is positively related to the difference between spreads on the floor and in the screen trading system and is at least partially negatively related to return volatility. We further document that spreads in the electronic trading system respond more heavily to changes in return volatility and that the adverse selection component of the spread is larger. We discuss implications our results have for the design of electronic trading systems.

58 citations

Posted Content
Laurent Frésard1
TL;DR: The authors showed that managers use the information they learn from the stock market when they decide on corporate cash savings, and that corporate savings are much more sensitive to stock price when the price contains more information that is new to managers.
Abstract: This paper shows that managers use the information they learn from the stock market when they decide on corporate cash savings. In particular, corporate savings are much more sensitive to stock price when the price contains more information that is new to managers. Moreover, the significant effect of stock price informativeness on the savings-to-price sensitivity is not due to market mispricings and remains even after controlling for various sources of public and managerial private information. Overall, the results highlight a new channel through which the stock market affects corporate decisions, which suggests that the stock market is not a sideshow.

58 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine how international development funding and accountability requirements are implicated in the disarticulation of a social movement, and highlight how accountability enables a form of governance that makes possible the emergence of entities (with specific attributes), while restricting others.
Abstract: This paper examines how international development funding and accountability requirements are implicated in the so-called disarticulation of a social movement. Based on field studies in Guatemala and El Salvador, we show and explain the way accountability requirements, which encompass management and accounting, legal, and financial technologies, constitute the field of international development through the regulation of heterogeneous social movement organizations. We highlight how accountability enables a form of governance that makes possible the emergence of entities (with specific attributes), while restricting others. Our analysis has implications for governmentality studies that have examined the interrelation of assemblages by analyzing how these interrelations are operationalized at the field level through the Deleuze-and-Guattari-inspired processes of territorialization, coding, and overcoding.

57 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information was addressed and it was shown that any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e>0.

57 citations


Authors

Showing all 605 results

NameH-indexPapersCitations
Sandor Czellar133126391049
Jean-Yves Reginster110119558146
Pierre Hansen7857532505
Gilles Laurent7726427052
Olivier Bruyère7257924788
David Dubois5016912396
Rodolphe Durand4917310075
Itzhak Gilboa4925913352
Yves Dallery471706373
Duc Khuong Nguyen472358639
Eric Jondeau451557088
Jean-Noël Kapferer4515112264
David Thesmar411617242
Bruno Biais411448936
Barbara B. Stern40896001
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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Institution in previous years
YearPapers
20239
202233
2021129
2020141
2019110
2018136