HEC Paris

About: HEC Paris is a education organization based out in Jouy-en-Josas, France. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Investment (macroeconomics) & Market liquidity. The organization has 584 authors who have published 2756 publications receiving 104467 citations. The organization is also known as: Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales & HEC School of Management Paris.

Analyzing joint ventures as corporate control activity

Abstract: We analyze joint ventures initiated by two publicly traded firms, and compare the results to asset sales and mergers. Combined returns are significantly greater for joint ventures than asset sales, and smaller than mergers. Gains are shared between joint venture parties, unlike asset sales and mergers where all gains accrue to sellers/targets. Ownership structure has no effect on joint venture returns. Combined gains from quasi-asset-sale joint ventures are significantly greater than for asset sales, and similar to mergers. Horizontal joint ventures generate greater gains than vertical or cross-industry ventures, and there is evidence that horizontal ventures capitalize expected monopoly rents.

The Role of Market-Oriented Institutions in the Deployment of Renewable Energies: Evidences from Europe

Abstract: Focusing on European countries, this paper investigates the link between market-oriented institutions, as measured by the economic freedom index, and the production of energy from renewable sources. A dynamic panel approach shows that this correlation is positive and significant while the subcomponents of the economic freedom index reveal that not all market-oriented institutions have a similar impact. Indeed, long-term price stability and freedom to trade boost the reliance on renewable energies whereas the importance given to markets rather than governments has no significant impact.

Mindless, Harmless, and Blameworthy

Abstract: There is a compelling simplicity to the theoretical approach to moral judgment proposed by Gray, Young, and Waytz (this issue; henceforth GYW). On their approach, all that is needed to account for ...

The Effects of Serving Two Masters and Using the Internal Audit Function as a Management Training Ground on Internal Auditors' Objectivity

Abstract: In this study, seventy-nine experienced internal auditors from the gaming industry participated in an experiment designed to investigate two factors that may affect internal auditors' objectivity: (1) reporting to two masters (management or audit committee) who have conflicting preferences and (2) whether or not the internal audit function (IAF) is used as a management training ground (MTG). The participants completed a case – developed with assistance from industry chief audit executives – wherein they were asked to evaluate business risks associated with a major gaming investment and to make a final recommendation. The results include three important findings. First, the internal auditors' risk assessments reveal an interaction effect between masters’ preferences (MP) and MTG. When the IAF is not used as a MTG, internal auditors' risks assessments do not significantly differ when the IAF reports to senior management versus the audit committee. However, when the IAF is used as a MTG, internal auditors' risk assessments are significantly lower when the IAF reports to senior management versus the audit committee. Second, the internal auditors' recommendations show that they provided more favorable recommendations regarding the investment to the audit committee than to management. Third, when the IAF is used as a MTG, the internal auditors provide more favorable recommendations than when the IAF is not a MTG. Overall our results highlight the interplay between MP and whether or not the IAF is being used as a MTG on internal auditors’ objectivity.

Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information

Abstract: We study a two-player, zero-sum, stochastic game with incomplete information on one side in which the players are allowed to play more and more frequently. The informed player observes the realization of a Markov chain on which the payoffs depend, while the non-informed player only observes his opponent's actions. We show the existence of a limit value as the time span between two consecutive stages vanishes; this value is characterized through an auxiliary optimization problem and as the solution of an Hamilton-Jacobi equation.