HEC Paris

About: HEC Paris is a education organization based out in Jouy-en-Josas, France. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Investment (macroeconomics) & Market liquidity. The organization has 584 authors who have published 2756 publications receiving 104467 citations. The organization is also known as: Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales & HEC School of Management Paris.

Set-valued approachability and online learning with partial monitoring

Abstract: Approachability has become a standard tool in analyzing learning algorithms in the adversarial online learning setup. We develop a variant of approachability for games where there is ambiguity in the obtained reward: it belongs to a set rather than being a single vector. Using this variant we tackle the problem of approachability in games with partial monitoring and develop a simple and generally efficient strategy (i.e., with constant per-step complexity) for this setup. As an important example, we instantiate our general strategy to the case when external regret or internal regret is to be minimized under partial monitoring.

A Calibratable Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium

Abstract: This paper presents a united framework for understanding the determinants of both CEOincentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model s closed form solutions yield testable predictions for how incentives should vary across arms under optimal contracting. In particular, our calibrations show that the negative relationship between the CEO s executive equity stake and arm size is quantitatively consistent with e¢ ciency and need not re ect rent extraction. Ourmodel and data both also imply that the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in arm value, scaled by annual pay, is independent of arm size. This may render it an attractive incentive measure as it is comparable between arms and over time. The theory also predicts a positive relationship between pay volatility and rm volatility, and that risk and effort affect total pay along the cross-section but not in the aggregate. Finally, we demonstrate that incentive compensation is executive at solving large agency problems, such as selecting corporate strategy, but smaller issues such as perk consumption are best addressed through direct monitoring.

Sell-off or shut-down? Alliance portfolio diversity and two types of high tech firms’ exit

Abstract: Alliance portfolio diversity (APD) – defined as differences between firms’ types of alliance partners (i.e. horizontal, upstream, and downstream) – is a strategic determinant of firm survival. This article analyzes APD in the context of high tech firms who rely on various partners to access complementary resources and secure their business survival, and argues that APD has different impacts on two main types of exit – sell-off and shut-down – which have been combined in previous research. Findings from a comprehensive study of French biotech firms from 1994 to 2002 show that the relationship between APD and shut-down is positive and linear whereas that between APD and sell-off is an inverted U-shaped. The article also finds evidence that the association between APD and firm exit mode is contingent on a firm’s resources and capabilities. The implications for research and managerial practice are discussed.