Central Economics and Mathematics Institute

About: Central Economics and Mathematics Institute is a facility organization based out in Moscow, Russia. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Population & Foreign-exchange reserves. The organization has 297 authors who have published 580 publications receiving 6449 citations. The organization is also known as: Federal State Institution of Science Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Hiring Strategies and the Evolution of Honesty

Abstract: The evolution of honesty norms in a society is studied. Our approach is based on the hypothesis that hiring or firing strategies chosen by firms may affect honesty: if it becomes common knowledge in the society that being honest is better for workers than cheating employers, then the share of opportunists gradually go down. It is shown that different hiring strategies are rational under different honesty standards. If honesty is not a prevailing social norm and volumes of appropriated rent may by high enough, then firms are better off to stimulate honest behavior by increasing wages. For a relatively honest society, firing cheaters is the best strategy. If honesty standards are intermediate or citizens are too impatient, ignorance of cheating may be rational. Therefore one observes three possible patterns of honesty evolution: honesty norms may either descend to critically low level or stabilize at some point or rise and fall cyclically. We prove that honesty standard rises as losses from dishonest behavior or hiring cost increase, honesty standard falls as rent appropriation opportunities expand or citizens get more impatient, and high expectations of economic growth promote honesty.

How an aggressively expanding insurance company becomes insolvent

Abstract: This paper aims to model a rational firm expanding on a regulated competitive insurance market. While the market is profitable, an aggressive price cut makes the firm’s market shares and revenue climb due to immigration of insureds. But the revenue’s growth may be slower than the growth in reserves needed to maintain the annual probabilities of ruin equal to a legally predetermined value. It will result in a progressive run-out of the funds allocated for the company’s strategic growth and is fraught with inability to meet the legal solvency requirements.

Special Issue on Variational Inequalities: Consistent Conjectural Variations Coincide with the Nash Solution in the Meta-Model

Abstract: We keep investigating the properties of consistent conjectural variations equilibrium (CCVE) developed for a single-commodity oligopoly. Although, in general, the consistent conjectures are distinct from those of Cournot-Nash, in our previous papers, we established the following remarkable fact. Define a meta-model as such where the players are the same agents as in the original oligopoly but now using the conjectures as their strategies. Then the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the meta-model generated the consistent conjectural variations equilibrium in the original oligopoly. In this paper, we study the conditions under which the inverse is also true, that it, every consistent CVE provides for the Cournot-Nash optimal strategies for the meta-model. This equivalence allows one to extend the concept of CCVE to other kinds of economic and financial models lacking the oligopoly structure.