Stockholm School of Economics

About: Stockholm School of Economics is a education organization based out in Stockholm, Sweden. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Population & Entrepreneurship. The organization has 1186 authors who have published 4891 publications receiving 285543 citations. The organization is also known as: Stockholm Business School & Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.

Theory and Methods of Economic Evaluation of Health Care

Abstract: List of Figures. List of Tables. Preface. 1. Introduction. 2. Welfare Economics. 3. The Monetary Value of Health Changes. 4. The Resource Consequences of Health Changes. 5. The Revealed Preference Approach. 6. The Expressed Preference Approach. 7. The Estimation of Costs. 8. Additional Issues in Cost-Benefit Analysis. 9. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis. 10. Cost-Utility Analysis. 11. Economic Evaluation and Policy Making. 12. Concluding Remarks. Index.

Management control, culture and ethnicity in a Chinese Indonesian company

Abstract: This study explores socio-cultural aspects of management control in a Chinese Indonesian manufacturing company. Ethnographic data collection methods were combined with grounded theory data analysis to explore how cultures, ethnic differences, history, politics, and commercial considerations shaped management controls. A combination of emic and etic methods were used to generate grounded comparisons with nomethetic research on culture and control in a cultural contingency tradition. Chinese Indonesians own most Indonesian private domestic capital despite being an ethnic minority (3–4% of population) and having suffered extensive discrimination. The case links the Chinese businessmen’s values to socialisation during childhood and then examines how their interaction with the Javanese culture of pribumi employees, ethnic tensions between employers and employees, and organisational and economic factors affected management control. Consistent with previous cultural contingency research the Chinese owners’ preferences resided with controlling behaviour through personnel and behavioural controls, low budget participation, centralisation, subjective rather than objective controls, and tentatively, few rewards tied to results and the use of group rewards. Whether Chinese managers exhibited longer term orientations concerning planning and rewards could not be ascertained. However, ethnic tensions and commercial considerations mitigated the owners’ ability to control according to cultural preferences. Based upon these findings reflections on past research and suggestions for further developments are made with respect to methods, methodology, and incorporating a broader range of theories and issues, especially ethnicity, politics, and history.

Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia

Abstract: How does regulatory capture affect growth? We construct measures of the political power of firms and regional regulatory capture using microlevel data on the preferential treatment of firms through regional laws and regulations in Russia during the period 1992--2000. Using these measures, we find that: (1) politically powerful firms perform better on average; (2) a high level of regulatory capture hurts the performance of firms that have no political connections and boosts the performance of politically connected firms; (3) capture adversely affects small-business growth and the tax capacity of the state; and (4) there is no evidence that capture affects aggregate growth. "oligarchy ... throws a close network of dependence relationships over all the economic and political institutions of present-day bourgeois society without exception... ." --Vladimir Lenin, "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism" (1916) Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Homo moralis—Preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching

Abstract: What preferences will prevail in a society of rational individuals when preference evolution is driven by the resulting payoffs? We show that when individuals’ preferences are their private information, a convex combination of selfishness and morality stands out as evolutionarily stable. We call individuals with such preferences homo moralis .A t one end of the spectrum is homo oeconomicus, who acts so as to maximize his or her own payoff. At the opposite end is homo kantiensis, who does what would be “the right thing to do,” in terms of payoffs, if all others would do likewise. We show that the stable degree of morality—the weight placed on the moral goal—is determined by the degree of assortativity in the process whereby individuals are matched to interact.