Institution
Stockholm School of Economics
Education•Stockholm, Sweden•
About: Stockholm School of Economics is a education organization based out in Stockholm, Sweden. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Population & Entrepreneurship. The organization has 1186 authors who have published 4891 publications receiving 285543 citations. The organization is also known as: Stockholm Business School & Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.
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TL;DR: A model of knowledge management is developed that builds on the interplay between articulated and tacit knowledge at four different levels: the individual, the small group, the organization, and the interorganizational domain and the alternative N-form is characterized and suggested as more appropriate.
Abstract: A model of knowledge management is developed. It builds on the interplay between articulated and tacit knowledge at four different levels: the individual, the small group, the organization, and the interorganizational domain. The model is applied on differences between Western and Japanese patterns of knowledge management. These are related to organizational characteristics, such as employment systems, career patterns, and organization structure. Effective knowledge management is argued to require departures from the logic of hierarchical organization and the M-form structure. The alternative N-form is characterized and suggested as more appropriate. It entails combination of knowledge rather than its division, which is the basic principle in the M-form. Other attributes of the N-form are: temporary constellations of people, the importance of personnel at 'lower levels', lateral communication, a catalytic and architectural role for top management, strategies aimed at focusing and economies of depth, and heterarchical structures. In recent discussions of needed foci for the analysis of corporate strategy and theories of the firm, two types of calls for a shift of emphasis are increasingly heard. First, the internal organization and management of firms are emphasized. Rumelt, Schendel and Teece (1991: 22) stress 'organizational capabilities, rather than productmarket positions or tactics, as the enduring source of advantage.' Nelson and Winter (1982: 135) posed the challenge of developing the subject of 'organizational genetics,' indicating that 'the real work remains to be done.' Almost a decade later, Nelson (1991) insists even more strongly that differences between individual firms constitute a core problem, and that analyses have to consider firm strategies, structures and core capabilities in greater depth. The emerging ideas are claimed to serve as a basis 'not only as a guide to management, but also as a basis for a
1,610 citations
University of Southern California1, Duke University2, Stockholm School of Economics3, Center for Open Science4, University of Virginia5, University of Amsterdam6, University of Pennsylvania7, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill8, University of Regensburg9, California Institute of Technology10, New York University11, Research Institute of Industrial Economics12, Cardiff University13, Northwestern University14, Mathematica Policy Research15, Ohio State University16, University of Sussex17, Texas A&M University18, Royal Holloway, University of London19, University of Zurich20, University of Melbourne21, University of Wisconsin-Madison22, University of Michigan23, Stanford University24, Rutgers University25, Columbia University26, University of Washington27, University of Edinburgh28, National University of Singapore29, Utrecht University30, Arizona State University31, Princeton University32, University of California, Los Angeles33, Imperial College London34, University of Innsbruck35, Harvard University36, University of Chicago37, University of Pittsburgh38, University of Notre Dame39, University of California, Berkeley40, Johns Hopkins University41, University of Bristol42, University of New South Wales43, Dartmouth College44, Whitman College45, University of Puerto Rico46, University of Milan47, University of California, Irvine48, Paris Dauphine University49, University of British Columbia50, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich51, Purdue University52, Washington University in St. Louis53, University of California, Davis54, Microsoft55
TL;DR: The default P-value threshold for statistical significance is proposed to be changed from 0.05 to 0.005 for claims of new discoveries in order to reduce uncertainty in the number of discoveries.
Abstract: We propose to change the default P-value threshold for statistical significance from 0.05 to 0.005 for claims of new discoveries.
1,586 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose that dispersed outside ownership and the resulting managerial discretion come with costs but also with benefits, and demonstrate that monitoring and hence ownership concentration may conflict with performance-based incentive schemes.
Abstract: We propose that dispersed outside ownership and the resulting managerial discretion come with costs but also with benefits. Even when tight control by shareholders is ex post efficient, it constitutes ex ante an expropriation threat that reduces managerial initiative and noncontractible investments. In addition, we show that equity implements state contingent control, a feature usually associated with debt. Finally, we demonstrate that monitoring, and hence ownership concentration, may conflict with performance-based incentive schemes.
1,532 citations
TL;DR: This paper developed models such as the heterarchy (Hedlund, 1986) and the transnational (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989) to reflect the critical role played by many subsidiaries in their corporations' competitiveness.
Abstract: There has been a profound evolution in thinking about multinational corporations (MNCs) [since the late 1980s]. Traditionally, in academic models researchers assumed that ownership-specific advantages were developed at the corporate headquarters and leveraged overseas through the transfer of technology to a network of foreign subsidiaries (Vernon, 1966; Dunning, 1981). As these overseas subsidiaries grew in size and developed their own unique resources, however, it became apparent to many researchers that corporate headquarters was no longer the sole source of competitive advantage for the MNC. Scholars developed models such as the heterarchy (Hedlund, 1986) and the transnational (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989) to reflect the critical role played by many subsidiaries in their corporations’ competitiveness, and research attention began to shift toward understanding the new roles played by subsidiaries.
1,417 citations
TL;DR: The authors discusses evidence on the short-run and long-run performance of companies going public in many countries and analyzes differences in average initial returns in terms of binding regulations, contractual mechanisms, and the characteristics of the firms going public.
Abstract: This paper discusses evidence on the short-run and long-run performance of companies going public in many countries. Differences in average initial returns are analyzed in terms of binding regulations, contractual mechanisms, and the characteristics of the firms going public. The evidence suggests that the move in recent years by most East Asian countries to reduce regulatory interference in the setting of offering prices should result in less short-run underpricing in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Evidence is presented that companies successfully time their offerings for periods when valuations are high, with investors receiving low returns in the long-run. Implications for investors, issuers, and regulators are discussed.
1,348 citations
Authors
Showing all 1218 results
| Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Magnus Johannesson | 102 | 342 | 40776 |
| Thomas J. Sargent | 96 | 370 | 39224 |
| Bengt Jönsson | 81 | 365 | 33623 |
| J. Scott Armstrong | 76 | 445 | 33552 |
| Johan Wiklund | 74 | 288 | 30038 |
| Per Davidsson | 71 | 309 | 32262 |
| Julian Birkinshaw | 64 | 233 | 29262 |
| Timo Teräsvirta | 62 | 224 | 20403 |
| Lars E.O. Svensson | 61 | 188 | 20666 |
| Jonathan D. Ostry | 59 | 232 | 11776 |
| Alexander Ljungqvist | 59 | 139 | 14466 |
| Richard Green | 58 | 468 | 14244 |
| Bo Jönsson | 57 | 294 | 11984 |
| Magnus Henrekson | 56 | 261 | 13346 |
| Assar Lindbeck | 54 | 234 | 13761 |