Institution
National Bureau of Economic Research
Nonprofit•Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States•
About: National Bureau of Economic Research is a nonprofit organization based out in Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Population. The organization has 2626 authors who have published 34177 publications receiving 2818124 citations. The organization is also known as: NBER & The National Bureau of Economic Research.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the role of bribes and using a broader data set from the OECD, Latin America, and transition economies, find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of GDP when there is more corruption and when the rule of law is weaker.
Abstract: Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997) find that the share of the unofficial economy in GDP is determined by the extent of control rights held by politicians and bureaucrats in post-communist economies. Exploring in more detail the role of bribes and using a broader data set from the OECD, Latin America, and transition economies, we find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of GDP when there is more corruption and when the rule of law is weaker. While these findings are consistent with the earlier results for transition economies, in the larger country sample we find it is not necessarily the case that more regulation or higher taxes directly increases the size of the unofficial economy. The problem appears to be not regulation or taxation per se, but whether the state administrative system can operate without corruption. A high level of regulatory discretion helps create the potential for corruption and drive firms into the unofficial economy.
923 citations
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TL;DR: Around the world, financial literacy is critical to retirement security and instrumental variables estimates show that the effects of financial literacy on retirement planning tend to be underestimated.
Abstract: In an increasingly risky and globalized marketplace, people must be able to make well-informed financial decisions. Yet new international research demonstrates that financial illiteracy is widespread when financial markets are well developed as in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Japan, Italy, New Zealand, and the United States, or when they are changing rapidly as in Russia. Further, across these countries, we show that the older population believes itself well informed, even though it is actually less well informed than average. Other common patterns are also evident: women are less financially literate than men and are aware of this shortfall. More educated people are more informed, yet education is far from a perfect proxy for literacy. There are also ethnic/racial and regional differences: city-dwellers in Russia are better informed than their rural counterparts, while in the U.S., African Americans and Hispanics are relatively less literate than others. Moreover, the more financially literate are also those most likely to plan for retirement. In fact, answering one additional financial question correctly is associated with a 3-4 percentage point higher chance of planning for retirement in countries as diverse as Germany, the U.S., Japan, and Sweden; in the Netherlands, it boosts planning by 10 percentage points. Finally, using instrumental variables, we show that these estimates probably underestimate the effects of financial literacy on retirement planning. In sum, around the world, financial literacy is critical to retirement security.
920 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used data from U.S. states to investigate whether electoral accountability affects economic policy choices and found that facing a binding term limit affects choices on taxes, expenditures, state minimum wages and mandates on workers' compensation.
Abstract: This paper uses data from U.S. states to investigate whether electoral accountability affects economic policy choices. We set up a model in which the possibility of being re-elected may curtail opportunistic behavior by incumbent governors. We find that facing a binding term limit affects choices on taxes, expenditures, state minimum wages and mandates on workers' compensation. Such effects are found also to vary with the party affiliation of the incumbent. The Democratic party also appears to suffer at the polls following the term of a lame-duck, Democratic incumbent.
919 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide evidence on the fit of the New Phillips Curve (NPQ) for the Euro area over the period 1970-1998, and use it as a tool to compare the characteristics of European inflation dynamics with those observed in the U.S. They also analyze the factors underlying inflation inertia by examining the cyclical behavior of marginal costs, as well as that of its two main components.
Abstract: We provide evidence on the fit of the New Phillips Curve (NPQ for the Euro area over the period 1970-1998, and use it as a tool to compare the characteristics of European inflation dynamics with those observed in the U.S. We also analyze the factors underlying inflation inertia by examining the cyclical behavior of marginal costs, as well as that of its two main components, namely, labor productivity and real wages. Some of the findings can be summarized as follows: (a) the NPC fits Euro area data very well, possibly better than U.S. data, (b) the degree of price stickiness implied by the estimates is substantial, but in line with survey evidence and U.S. estimates, (c) inflation dynamics in the Euro area appear to have a stronger forward- looking component (i.e., less inertia) than in the U.S., (d) labor market frictions, as manifested in the behavior of the wage markup, appear to have played a key role in shaping the behavior of marginal costs and, consequently, inflation in Europe.
918 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations, including static models of objective performance measurement in which firms get what they pay for; repeated-game models of subjective performance assessments; incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort; and incentive contracts between versus within organizations.
Abstract: In this paper I summarize four new strands in agency theory that help me think about incentives in real organizations. As a point of departure, I being with a quick sketch of the classic agency model. I then discuss static models of objective performance measurement in which firms get what they pay for; repeated-game models of subjective performance assessments; incentives for skill development rather than simply for effort; and incentive contracts between versus within organizations. I conclude by suggesting two avenues for further progress in agency theory: better integration with organizational economics, as launched by Coase and reinvigorated by Williamson, and cross-pollination with other fields that study organizations, including industrial relations, organizational sociology, and social psychology.
918 citations
Authors
Showing all 2855 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
James J. Heckman | 175 | 766 | 156816 |
Andrei Shleifer | 171 | 514 | 271880 |
Joseph E. Stiglitz | 164 | 1142 | 152469 |
Daron Acemoglu | 154 | 734 | 110678 |
Gordon H. Hanson | 152 | 1434 | 119422 |
Edward L. Glaeser | 137 | 550 | 83601 |
Alberto Alesina | 135 | 498 | 93388 |
Martin B. Keller | 131 | 541 | 65069 |
Jeffrey D. Sachs | 130 | 692 | 86589 |
John Y. Campbell | 128 | 400 | 98963 |
Robert J. Barro | 124 | 519 | 121046 |
René M. Stulz | 124 | 470 | 81342 |
Paul Krugman | 123 | 347 | 102312 |
Ross Levine | 122 | 398 | 108067 |
Philippe Aghion | 122 | 507 | 73438 |