National Bureau of Economic Research

About: National Bureau of Economic Research is a nonprofit organization based out in Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Population. The organization has 2626 authors who have published 34177 publications receiving 2818124 citations. The organization is also known as: NBER & The National Bureau of Economic Research.

Gene discovery and polygenic prediction from a genome-wide association study of educational attainment in 1.1 million individuals

Abstract: Here we conducted a large-scale genetic association analysis of educational attainment in a sample of approximately 1.1 million individuals and identify 1,271 independent genome-wide-significant SNPs. For the SNPs taken together, we found evidence of heterogeneous effects across environments. The SNPs implicate genes involved in brain-development processes and neuron-to-neuron communication. In a separate analysis of the X chromosome, we identify 10 independent genome-wide-significant SNPs and estimate a SNP heritability of around 0.3% in both men and women, consistent with partial dosage compensation. A joint (multi-phenotype) analysis of educational attainment and three related cognitive phenotypes generates polygenic scores that explain 11-13% of the variance in educational attainment and 7-10% of the variance in cognitive performance. This prediction accuracy substantially increases the utility of polygenic scores as tools in research.

Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures

Abstract: Corruption is attracting a lot of attention around the world. The paper surveys and discusses issues related to the causes, consequences, and scope of corruption and possible corrective actions. It emphasizes the costs of corruption in terms of economic growth. It also emphasizes that the fight against corruption may not be cheap and cannot be independent from the reform of the state. If certain reforms are not made, corruption is likely to continue to be a problem regardless of actions directly aimed at curtailing it.

Long-Term Memory in Stock Market Prices

Abstract: A test for long-run memory that is robust to short-range dependence is developed. It is a simple extension of Mandelbrot's "range over standard deviation" or R/S statistic, for which the relevant asymptotic sampling theory is derived via functional central limit theory. This test is applied to daily, weekly, monthly, and annual stock returns indexes over several different time periods. Contrary to previous findings, there is no evidence of long-range dependence in any of the indexes over any sample period or sub-period once short-term autocorrelations are taken into account. Illustrative Monte Carlo experiments indicate that the modified R/S test has power against at least two specific models of long-run memory, suggesting that stochastic models of short-range dependence may adequately capture the time series behavior of stock returns.

Crime and Social Interactions

Abstract: The high degree of variance of crime rates across space (and across time) is one of the oldest puzzles in the social sciences (see Quetelet (1835)). Our empirical work strongly suggests that this variance is not the result of observed or unobserved geographic attributes. This paper presents a model where social interactions create enough covariance across individuals to explain the high cross- city variance of crime rates. This model provides a natural index of social interactions which can compare the degree of social interaction across crimes, across geographic 1units and across time. Our index gives similar results for different data samples and suggests that the amount of social interactions are highest in petty crimes (such as larceny and auto theft), moderate in more serious crimes (assault, burglary and robbery) and almost negligible in murder and rape. The index of social interactions is also applied to non-criminal choices and we find that there is substantial interaction in schooling choice.

Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are

Abstract: The contracting view of CEO pay assumes that pay is used by shareholders to solve an agency problem. Simple models of the contracting view predict that pay should not be tied to luck, where luck is defined as observable shocks to performance beyond the CEO's control. Using several measures of luck, we find that CEO pay in fact responds as much to a lucky dollar as to a general dollar. A skimming model, where the CEO has captured the pay-setting process, is consistent with this fact. Because some complications to the contracting view could also generate pay for luck, we test for skimming directly by examining the effect of governance. Consistent with skimming, we find that better governed firms pay their CEO less for luck.