Institution
National Bureau of Economic Research
Nonprofit•Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States•
About: National Bureau of Economic Research is a nonprofit organization based out in Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Monetary policy & Population. The organization has 2626 authors who have published 34177 publications receiving 2818124 citations. The organization is also known as: NBER & The National Bureau of Economic Research.
Papers published on a yearly basis
Papers
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TL;DR: It is shown how a cost-effectiveness criterion can be derived to guide resource allocation decisions, and how it varies with age, gender, income level, and risk aversion.
725 citations
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TL;DR: In a simple model of capital budgeting in a diversified firm where headquarters has limited power, the authors show that funds are allocated towards the most inefficient divisions and the distortion is greater the more diverse are the investment opportunities of the firm's divisions.
Abstract: In a simple model of capital budgeting in a diversified firm where headquarters has limited power, we show that funds are allocated towards the most inefficient divisions The distortion is greater the more diverse are the investment opportunities of the firm's divisions We test these implications on a panel of diversified firms in the US during the period 1979-1993 We find that i) diversified firms mis-allocate investment funds; ii) the extent of mis-allocation is positively related to the diversity of the investment opportunities across divisions; iii) the discount at which these diversified firms trade is positively related to the extent of the investment mis-allocation and to the diversity of the investment opportunities across divisions
724 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, a framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of internal versus external capital allocation is presented, focusing pritnarily on comparing an internal capital market with bank lending.
Abstract: This paper presents a framework for analyzing the costs and benefits of internal versus external capital allocation We focus pritnarily on comparing an internal capital market with bank lending While both represent centralized forms of financing, in the former case the financing is owner-provided, while in the latter ceise it is not We argue that the ownership aspect of internal capital allocation has three important consequences: (1) it leads to more monitoring than bank lending; (2) it reduces managers' entrepreneurial incentives; and (3) it makes it easier to efficiently redeploy the assets of projects that are performing poorly under existing management
723 citations
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TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a continuous time equilibrium model of bubbles where overconfidence generates disagreements among agents regarding asset fundamentals, and they show how overconfidence can justify the use of corporate strategies that would not be rewarding in a "rational" environment.
Abstract: Motivated by the behavior of internet stock prices in 1998-2000, we present a continuous time equilibrium model of bubbles where overconfidence generates disagreements among agents regarding asset fundamentals. With short-sale constraints, an asset owner has an option to sell the asset to other over-confident agents who have more optimistic beliefs. This re-sale option has a recursive structure, that is, a buyer of the asset gets the option to resell it. This causes a significant bubble component in asset prices even when small differences of beliefs are sufficient to generate a trade. Agents pay prices that exceed their own valuation of future dividends because they believe that in the future they will find a buyer willing to pay even more. The model generates prices that are above fundamentals, excessive trading, excess volatility, and predictable returns. However, our analysis shows that while Tobin's tax can substantially reduce speculative trading when transaction costs are small, it has only a limited impact on the size of the bubble or on price volatility. We give an example where the price of a subsidiary is larger than its parent firm. Finally, we show how overconfidence can justify the use of corporate strategies that would not be rewarding in a "rational" environment.
721 citations
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TL;DR: The authors argue that trade in intermediate inputs, or "global production sharing," is a potentially important explanation for the increase in the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in the U.S. and elsewhere.
Abstract: We argue that trade in intermediate inputs, or 'global production sharing,' is a potentially important explanation for the increase in the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in the U.S. and elsewhere. Using a simple model of heterogeneous activities within an industry, we show that trade in inputs has much the same impact on labor demand as does skill-biased technical change: both of these will shift demand away from low-skilled activities, while raising relative demand and wages of the higher skilled. Thus, distinguishing whether the change in wages is due to international trade, or technological change, is fundamentally an empirical rather than a theoretical question. We review three empirical methods that have been used to estimate the effects of trade in intermediate inputs and technological change on wages, and summarize the evidence for the U.S. and other countries.
720 citations
Authors
Showing all 2855 results
Name | H-index | Papers | Citations |
---|---|---|---|
James J. Heckman | 175 | 766 | 156816 |
Andrei Shleifer | 171 | 514 | 271880 |
Joseph E. Stiglitz | 164 | 1142 | 152469 |
Daron Acemoglu | 154 | 734 | 110678 |
Gordon H. Hanson | 152 | 1434 | 119422 |
Edward L. Glaeser | 137 | 550 | 83601 |
Alberto Alesina | 135 | 498 | 93388 |
Martin B. Keller | 131 | 541 | 65069 |
Jeffrey D. Sachs | 130 | 692 | 86589 |
John Y. Campbell | 128 | 400 | 98963 |
Robert J. Barro | 124 | 519 | 121046 |
René M. Stulz | 124 | 470 | 81342 |
Paul Krugman | 123 | 347 | 102312 |
Ross Levine | 122 | 398 | 108067 |
Philippe Aghion | 122 | 507 | 73438 |