Proceedings ArticleDOI
Physical unclonable functions for device authentication and secret key generation
G. Edward Suh,Srinivas Devadas +1 more
- pp 9-14
TLDR
This work presents PUF designs that exploit inherent delay characteristics of wires and transistors that differ from chip to chip, and describes how PUFs can enable low-cost authentication of individual ICs and generate volatile secret keys for cryptographic operations.Abstract:
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are innovative circuit primitives that extract secrets from physical characteristics of integrated circuits (ICs). We present PUF designs that exploit inherent delay characteristics of wires and transistors that differ from chip to chip, and describe how PUFs can enable low-cost authentication of individual ICs and generate volatile secret keys for cryptographic operations.read more
Citations
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Bit selection algorithm suitable for high-volume production of SRAM-PUF
TL;DR: The analysis of real SRAM PUFs reveals critical conditions on which to select stable SRAM cells for PUF at low-cost and develops a bit selection procedure that produces very stable bits for the PUF generated ID/key.
Book ChapterDOI
Physically uncloneable functions in the universal composition framework
TL;DR: This paper augments Canetti's universal composition (UC) framework by considering Physically Uncloneable Functions (PUFs) in the UC framework, and devise efficient UC-secure protocols for basic tasks like oblivious transfer, commitments, and key exchange.
Journal ArticleDOI
Machine-Learning Attacks on PolyPUFs, OB-PUFs, RPUFs, LHS-PUFs, and PUF–FSMs
TL;DR: The focus and novelty of this paper is the development of efficient impersonation attacks on the following five Arbiter PUF–based authentication protocols, with the common flaw that the use of lightweight obfuscation logic provides insufficient protection against machine-learning attacks.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Flash Memory for Ubiquitous Hardware Security Functions: True Random Number Generation and Device Fingerprints
TL;DR: It is demonstrated that unmodified commercial Flash memory can provide two important security functions: true random number generation and digital fingerprints that can be used for identification and authentication.
Journal ArticleDOI
A Survey on Silicon PUFs and Recent Advances in Ring Oscillator PUFs
TL;DR: A survey on the current state-of-the-art of silicon PUFs is given, known attacks to PUFs and the countermeasures are analyzed, and PUF-based applications are discussed.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Physical one-way functions
TL;DR: The concept of fabrication complexity is introduced as a way of quantifying the difficulty of materially cloning physical systems with arbitrary internal states as primitives for physical analogs of cryptosystems.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Silicon physical random functions
TL;DR: It is argued that a complex integrated circuit can be viewed as a silicon PUF and a technique to identify and authenticate individual integrated circuits (ICs) is described.
Tamper resistance: a cautionary note
Ross Anderson,Markus G. Kuhn +1 more
TL;DR: It is concluded that trusting tamper resistance is problematic; smartcards are broken routinely, and even a device that was described by a government signals agency as 'the most secure processor generally available' turns out to be vulnerable.
Journal ArticleDOI
Extracting secret keys from integrated circuits
TL;DR: It is shown that arbiter-based PUFs are realizable and well suited to build key-cards that need to be resistant to physical attacks and to be identified securely and reliably over a practical range of environmental variations such as temperature and power supply voltage.
Journal ArticleDOI
Impact of die-to-die and within-die parameter fluctuations on the maximum clock frequency distribution for gigascale integration
TL;DR: In this paper, a model describing the maximum clock frequency distribution of a microprocessor is derived and compared with wafer sort data for a recent 0.25-/spl mu/m microprocessor.