International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis

About: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis is a nonprofit organization based out in Laxenburg, Austria. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Population & Greenhouse gas. The organization has 1369 authors who have published 5075 publications receiving 280467 citations. The organization is also known as: IIASA.

Agricultural non-CO2 emission reduction potential in the context of the 1.5 °C target

Abstract: Agricultural methane and nitrous oxide emissions represent around 10–12% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions and have a key role to play in achieving a 1.5 °C (above pre-industrial) climate stabilization target. Using a multi-model assessment approach, we quantify the potential contribution of agriculture to the 1.5 °C target and decompose the mitigation potential by emission source, region and mitigation mechanism. The results show that the livestock sector will be vital to achieve emission reductions consistent with the 1.5 °C target mainly through emission-reducing technologies or structural changes. Agriculture may contribute emission reductions of 0.8–1.4 Gt of CO2-equivalent (CO2e) yr−1 at just US$20 per tCO2e in 2050. Combined with dietary changes, emission reductions can be increased to 1.7–1.8 GtCO2e yr−1. At carbon prices compatible with the 1.5 °C target, agriculture could even provide average emission savings of 3.9 GtCO2e yr−1 in 2050, which represents around 8% of current GHG emissions. Agricultural CH4 and N2O emissions represent around 11% of total anthropogenic GHGs. Here agriculture mitigation potentials are quantified, in the context of the 1.5 °C target, and decomposed by emission source, region and mitigation mechanism.

The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas

Abstract: Self-interest frequently causes individuals engaged in joint enterprises to choose actions that are counterproductive. Free-riders can invade a society of cooperators, causing a tragedy of the commons. Such social dilemmas can be overcome by positive or negative incentives. Even though an incentive-providing institution may protect a cooperative society from invasion by free-riders, it cannot always convert a society of free-riders to cooperation. In the latter case, both norms, cooperation and defection, are stable: To avoid a collapse to full defection, cooperators must be sufficiently numerous initially. A society of free-riders is then caught in a social trap, and the institution is unable to provide an escape, except at a high, possibly prohibitive cost. Here, we analyze the interplay of (a) incentives provided by institutions and (b) the effects of voluntary participation. We show that this combination fundamentally improves the efficiency of incentives. In particular, optional participation allows institutions punishing free-riders to overcome the social dilemma at a much lower cost, and to promote a globally stable regime of cooperation. This removes the social trap and implies that whenever a society of cooperators cannot be invaded by free-riders, it will necessarily become established in the long run, through social learning, irrespective of the initial number of cooperators. We also demonstrate that punishing provides a “lighter touch” than rewarding, guaranteeing full cooperation at considerably lower cost.

Optimal location of wood gasification plants for methanol production with heat recovery

Abstract: Second generation biofuels from wood gasification are thought to become competitive in the face of effective climate and energy security policies. Cost competitiveness crucially depends on the opti ...