California State University, Long Beach

About: California State University, Long Beach is a education organization based out in Long Beach, California, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Population & Poison control. The organization has 10036 authors who have published 13933 publications receiving 377394 citations. The organization is also known as: Cal State Long Beach & Long Beach State.

Laboratory production of bromoform, methylene bromide, and methyl iodide by macroalgae and distribution in nearshore southern California waters

Abstract: Production rates of bromoform (CHBr,), methylene bromide (CH,Br,), and methyl iodide (CH31) were measured in the laboratory for 11 species of marine macroalgae. Production rates of the volatile bromomethanes extrapolated to a global scale suggest that marine macroalgae produce 2 x 10" g Br yr-I (1 x lo9 mol Br yr I), 98% of which is bromoform. Laminarians (kelps) produce 61% of this organic Br. These calculations suggest that marine macroalgae are important in the biogeochemical cycling of Br. Seawater concentrations of CHBr,, CH,Br,, and CH,I were deter- mined from various southern California coastal locales. High concentrations were measured in seawater from the canopy and the bottom of a dense bed of Macrocystis as compared to other sites. Surface seawater concentrations of these halomethanes showed a strong cross-shore gradient with the highest concentration in the kelp canopy and the lowest at 5 km offshore. Seawater adjacent to decaying macroalgae on the bottom of a submarine canyon was not enriched in halomethanes relative to- surface water. Water exiting a productive estuary was enriched only with CH,Br,, although two algal species that are abundant there (U/vu and Enteromorpha) showed high laboratory

Traffic surveillance and simulation apparatus

Abstract: A wide area surveillance system for application to large road networks is described. The system employs smart sensors to identify plural individual vehicles in the network. These vehicles are tracked on an individual basis, and the system derives the behavior of the vehicle. Furthermore, the system derives traffic behavior on a local basis, across roadway links, and in sections of the network. Processing in the system is divided into multiple processing layers, with geographical separation of tasks.

A complete and parametrically continuous kinematic model for robot manipulators

Abstract: A kinematic modeling convention for robot manipulators is proposed. The kinematic model is named for its completeness and parametric continuity (CPC) properties. Parametric continuity of the CPC model is achieved by adopting a singularity-free line representation consisting of four line parameters. Completeness is achieved through adding two link parameters to allow arbitrary placement of link coordinate frames. The transformations from the world frame to the base frame and from the last link frame to the tool frame can be modeled with the same modeling convention used for internal link transformations. Since all the redundant parameters in the CPC model can be systematically eliminated, a linearized robot error model can be constructed in which all error parameters are independent and span the entire geometric error space. The focus is on model construction, mappings between the CPC model and the Denavit-Hartenberg model, the study of the model properties, and its application to robot kinematic calibration. >

Client Importance, Non-Audit Services, and Abnormal Accruals

Abstract: Several recent studies examine the association between fees for audit and non-audit services, and auditor independence impairment. However, auditors' incentives to compromise their independence are proxied in different studies by different measures. The economic theory of auditor independence (Watts and Zimmerman 1981; DeAngelo 1981) suggests that auditors' incentives to compromise their independence are related to client importance, the ratio of quasi rents specific to the client divided by all other quasi rents. Following previous studies we use the ratio of a client's total fees to audit firm's total revenues as our first proxy for client importance. Because it has been argued that non-audit services have a higher margin than do audit services and therefore generate more quasi rents (revenues minus marginal costs), we also use a second measure of client importance, the ratio of non-audit fees from a client to the audit firm's total US revenues. If auditors care more about revenues of their practice office rather than the whole firm, then client importance should be assessed at the local office level. So we also use two additional proxies for client importance, client total fees and non-audit fees divided by a surrogate measure of practice-office revenues. To develop this surrogate measure we assume that clients are audited through the audit firm's practice office closest in distance to the client's headquarters, and allocate audit firm revenues to practice offices in proportion to the sum of log(sales) of clients of each office. Consistent with prior research we use abnormal accruals estimated using the (modified) Jones model as our measure of earnings, and therefore audit, quality. After controlling for industry effects and determinants of abnormal accruals based on previous studies, we do not find a significant cross-sectional association between the absolute value of abnormal accruals and any of the client importance ratios in our sample of 1,871 firms for the year 2000. Following suggestions in Greenwald (1975) we show that the lack of significance is unlikely to have resulted from low power of our tests. Our model development also suggests that independence impairment could be higher in sub-samples of clients that have greater opportunities or incentives to manage earnings, or those with weaker corporate governance structures. In addition, auditor expertise may create client dependence on auditor, and thereby strengthen auditors' independence. We measure earnings management opportunities using business and geographical diversification. We use leverage, market-to-book ratios, sales growth, and the number of shares and options owned by executives as a percentage of shares outstanding as proxies for client incentives. The strength of corporate governance is proxied by whether the chairman and CEO positions are separate, the percentage of non-employee directors, and percentage of shares owned by 5 percent block-holders. Auditor expertise is proxied by whether they are the industry specialist. We fail to find a significant association abnormal accruals and client importance measures for any of the sample partitions.