University of Wisconsin-Madison

About: University of Wisconsin-Madison is a education organization based out in Madison, Wisconsin, United States. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Population & Gene. The organization has 108707 authors who have published 237594 publications receiving 11883575 citations.

Comparative genomics reveals mobile pathogenicity chromosomes in Fusarium

Abstract: Fusarium species are among the most important phytopathogenic and toxigenic fungi. To understand the molecular underpinnings of pathogenicity in the genus Fusarium, we compared the genomes of three phenotypically diverse species: Fusarium graminearum, Fusarium verticillioides and Fusarium oxysporum f. sp. lycopersici. Our analysis revealed lineage-specific (LS) genomic regions in F. oxysporum that include four entire chromosomes and account for more than one-quarter of the genome. LS regions are rich in transposons and genes with distinct evolutionary profiles but related to pathogenicity, indicative of horizontal acquisition. Experimentally, we demonstrate the transfer of two LS chromosomes between strains of F. oxysporum, converting a non-pathogenic strain into a pathogen. Transfer of LS chromosomes between otherwise genetically isolated strains explains the polyphyletic origin of host specificity and the emergence of new pathogenic lineages in F. oxysporum. These findings put the evolution of fungal pathogenicity into a new perspective.

Culturally Relevant Pedagogy 2.0: a.k.a. the Remix

Abstract: In this article, Ladson-Billings reflects on the history of her theory of culturally relevant pedagogy and the ways it has been used and misused since its inception. She argues for the importance o...

An information integration theory of consciousness

Abstract: Background: Consciousness poses two main problems. The first is understanding the conditions that determine to what extent a system has conscious experience. For instance, why is our consciousness generated by certain parts of our brain, such as the thalamocortical system, and not by other parts, such as the cerebellum? And why are we conscious during wakefulness and much less so during dreamless sleep? The second problem is understanding the conditions that determine what kind of consciousness a system has. For example, why do specific parts of the brain contribute specific qualities to our conscious experience, such as vision and audition? Presentation of the hypothesis: This paper presents a theory about what consciousness is and how it can be measured. According to the theory, consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system to integrate information. This claim is motivated by two key phenomenological properties of consciousness: differentiation – the availability of a very large number of conscious experiences; and integration – the unity of each such experience. The theory states that the quantity of consciousness available to a system can be measured as the Φ value of a complex of elements. Φ is the amount of causally effective information that can be integrated across the informational weakest link of a subset of elements. A complex is a subset of elements with Φ>0 that is not part of a subset of higher Φ. The theory also claims that the quality of consciousness is determined by the informational relationships among the elements of a complex, which are specified by the values of effective information among them. Finally, each particular conscious experience is specified by the value, at any given time, of the variables mediating informational interactions among the elements of a complex. Testing the hypothesis: The information integration theory accounts, in a principled manner, for several neurobiological observations concerning consciousness. As shown here, these include the association of consciousness with certain neural systems rather than with others; the fact that neural processes underlying consciousness can influence or be influenced by neural processes that remain unconscious; the reduction of consciousness during dreamless sleep and generalized seizures; and the time requirements on neural interactions that support consciousness. Implications of the hypothesis: The theory entails that consciousness is a fundamental quantity, that it is graded, that it is present in infants and animals, and that it should be possible to build conscious artifacts.

Dark silicon and the end of multicore scaling

Abstract: Since 2005, processor designers have increased core counts to exploit Moore's Law scaling, rather than focusing on single-core performance. The failure of Dennard scaling, to which the shift to multicore parts is partially a response, may soon limit multicore scaling just as single-core scaling has been curtailed. This paper models multicore scaling limits by combining device scaling, single-core scaling, and multicore scaling to measure the speedup potential for a set of parallel workloads for the next five technology generations. For device scaling, we use both the ITRS projections and a set of more conservative device scaling parameters. To model single-core scaling, we combine measurements from over 150 processors to derive Pareto-optimal frontiers for area/performance and power/performance. Finally, to model multicore scaling, we build a detailed performance model of upper-bound performance and lower-bound core power. The multicore designs we study include single-threaded CPU-like and massively threaded GPU-like multicore chip organizations with symmetric, asymmetric, dynamic, and composed topologies. The study shows that regardless of chip organization and topology, multicore scaling is power limited to a degree not widely appreciated by the computing community. Even at 22 nm (just one year from now), 21% of a fixed-size chip must be powered off, and at 8 nm, this number grows to more than 50%. Through 2024, only 7.9x average speedup is possible across commonly used parallel workloads, leaving a nearly 24-fold gap from a target of doubled performance per generation.