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Institution

Tokyo Institute of Technology

EducationTokyo, Tôkyô, Japan
About: Tokyo Institute of Technology is a education organization based out in Tokyo, Tôkyô, Japan. It is known for research contribution in the topics: Catalysis & Thin film. The organization has 46775 authors who have published 101656 publications receiving 2357893 citations. The organization is also known as: Tokyo Tech & Tokodai.


Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors obtained defect energies with errors less than 0.2 eV for 17 defects in 10 compounds; the method is widely applicable to a range of defects and was improved on a previous method for correcting these errors.
Abstract: First-principles defect formation energy calculations can include errors up to several eV. Improving on a previous method for correcting these errors by Freysoldt et al (PRL 102, 016402), the authors obtain defect energies with errors less than 0.2 eV for 17 defects in 10 compounds; the method is widely applicable to a range of defects.

314 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors modeled grain boundaries in polycrystalline ZnO TFTs and performed simulation of the device by using a two-dimensional device simulator in order to determine the grain boundary effects on device performance.
Abstract: Thin-film transistors (TFTs) made of transparent channel semiconductors such as ZnO are of great technological importance because their insensitivity to visible light makes device structures simple. In fact, there have been several demonstrations of ZnO TFTs achieving reasonably good field effect mobilities of 1–10 cm2/V s, but the overall performance of ZnO TFTs has not been satisfactory, probably due to the presence of dense grain boundaries. We modeled grain boundaries in ZnO TFTs and performed simulation of a ZnO TFT by using a two-dimensional device simulator in order to determine the grain boundary effects on device performance. Polycrystalline ZnO TFT modeling was started by considering a single grain boundary in the middle of the TFT channel, formulated with a Gaussian defect distribution localized in the grain boundary. A double Schottky barrier was formed in the grain boundary, and its barrier height was analyzed as a function of defect density and gate bias. The simulation was extended to TFTs with many grain boundaries to quantitatively analyze the potential profiles that developed along the channel. One of the main differences between a polycrystalline ZnO TFT and a polycrystalline Si TFT is that the much smaller nanoscaled grains in a polycrystalline ZnO TFT induces a strong overlap of the double Schottky barriers with a higher activation energy in the crystallite and a lower barrier potential in the grain boundary at subthreshold or off-state region of its transfer characteristics. Through the simulation, we were able to estimate the density of total trap states localized in the grain boundaries for polycrystalline ZnO TFT by determining the apparent mobility and grain size in the device.

314 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jan 2009-Nature
TL;DR: All social norms, which depend on the action of the donor and the reputation of the recipient, are analyzed and all strategies that allow the evolutionary stability of cooperation are characterized.
Abstract: In human societies, altruistic behaviour can evolve when those who fail to co-operate acquire a bad reputation. But how far is it sensible to go on punishing those who don't cooperate, as punishment incurs a cost for both the punisher and the punished? Ohtsuki et al. explore the circumstances under which punishment is favoured using a game theory model in which all individuals observe the interactions between others and assess their reputation according to various social norms. They find that costly punishment can facilitate the evolution of cooperation, but only under a narrow set of parameters. As indirect reciprocity evolves to become more effective, costly punishment is rendered inefficient. In human societies, altruistic behaviour can evolve because those who fail to co-operate are lumbered with a bad reputation. This study explores the circumstances under which punishment is favoured using a game theory model in which all individuals observe the interactions between others and assess their reputation under various social norms. It is shown that punishment is only a successful strategy under a narrow set of parameters, including the relative costs of punishment and cooperation, the reliability of reputations and the spread of gossip. Indirect reciprocity1,2,3,4,5 is a key mechanism for the evolution of human cooperation. Our behaviour towards other people depends not only on what they have done to us but also on what they have done to others. Indirect reciprocity works through reputation5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17. The standard model of indirect reciprocity offers a binary choice: people can either cooperate or defect. Cooperation implies a cost for the donor and a benefit for the recipient. Defection has no cost and yields no benefit. Currently there is considerable interest in studying the effect of costly (or altruistic) punishment on human behaviour18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25. Punishment implies a cost for the punished person. Costly punishment means that the punisher also pays a cost. It has been suggested that costly punishment between individuals can promote cooperation. Here we study the role of costly punishment in an explicit model of indirect reciprocity. We analyse all social norms, which depend on the action of the donor and the reputation of the recipient. We allow errors in assigning reputation and study gossip as a mechanism for establishing coherence. We characterize all strategies that allow the evolutionary stability of cooperation. Some of those strategies use costly punishment; others do not. We find that punishment strategies typically reduce the average payoff of the population. Consequently, there is only a small parameter region where costly punishment leads to an efficient equilibrium. In most cases the population does better by not using costly punishment. The efficient strategy for indirect reciprocity is to withhold help for defectors rather than punishing them.

314 citations

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the first results of Phase 2 from an international comparison project to evaluate 32 urban land surface schemes are presented, which is the first large-scale systematic evaluation of these models.
Abstract: Urban land surface schemes have been developed to model the distinct features of the urban surface and the associated energy exchange processes. These models have been developed for a range of purposes and make different assumptions related to the inclusion and representation of the relevant processes. Here, the first results of Phase 2 from an international comparison project to evaluate 32 urban land surface schemes are presented. This is the first large-scale systematic evaluation of these models. In four stages, participants were given increasingly detailed information about an urban site for which urban fluxes were directly observed. At each stage, each group returned their models' calculated surface energy balance fluxes. Wide variations are evident in the performance of the models for individual fluxes. No individual model performs best for all fluxes. Providing additional information about the surface generally results in better performance. However, there is clear evidence that poor choice of parameter values can cause a large drop in performance for models that otherwise perform well. As many models do not perform well across all fluxes, there is need for caution in their application, and users should be aware of the implications for applications and decision making. Copyright  2010 Royal Meteorological Society

313 citations


Authors

Showing all 46967 results

NameH-indexPapersCitations
Matthew Meyerson194553243726
Yury Gogotsi171956144520
Masayuki Yamamoto1711576123028
H. Eugene Stanley1541190122321
Takashi Taniguchi1522141110658
Shu-Hong Yu14479970853
Kazunori Kataoka13890870412
Osamu Jinnouchi13588586104
Hector F. DeLuca133130369395
Shlomo Havlin131101383347
Hiroyuki Iwasaki131100982739
Kazunari Domen13090877964
Hideo Hosono1281549100279
Hideyuki Okano128116967148
Andreas Strasser12850966903
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Performance
Metrics
No. of papers from the Institution in previous years
YearPapers
202388
2022358
20213,457
20203,695
20193,783
20183,531